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Abstract
This paper analyzes  institutional arrangements  for public  located inside or outside the Ministry of Finance-four
debt management  by  reviewing  the experience  of OECD  issues are  of vital  importance:
countries during  the late  1980s and 1990s.  It discusses  - Giving priority  to strategic  public policy  objectives
principal-agent  issues arising  from the  delegation of  rather  than  tactical  trading objectives.
authority from  the Minister of Finance to the debt  - Strengthening the institutional  capacity to deal  with
management office  and describes  how countries have  financial  portfolio management  and with the public
designed governance  structures and control  and  policy aspects  of debt management.
monitoring mechanisms  to deal with these issues. The  o  Modernizing debt management.
paper also  discusses what lessons  emerging market  o  Creating mechanisms  to ensure  successful  delegation
countries  and transition countries  can  draw from  the  and accountability  to the Ministry of Finance  and
experience  of advanced OECD countries.  Parliament.
The OECD experience clearly  indicates that-
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SUMMARY
This paper analyzes institutional  arrangements  for public debt management by reviewing
the  experience  of  OECD  countries  during  the  late  1980s  and  1990s.  It  discusses
principal-agent  issues  arising  from  the  delegation  of authority  from  the  Minister  of
Finance  to  the  debt  management  office  (DMO)  and  describes  how  countries  have
designed  governance  structures  and  control .and  monitoring  mechanisms  to  deal  with
these  issues.  The  paper  also  discusses  what  lessons  emerging  market  countries  and
transition countries can draw from the experience of advanced OECD countries.
In the  1980s, public  debt/GDP  levels  and  financial risks  in the debt portfolio  of various
OECD  countries  rose  considerably  and  this  generated  a  strong  impetus  toward
modernizing  and  reforming  government  debt  management.  DMO  functions  were
consolidated  and  gradually  public  debt  management  was  separated  from  the
implementation' of monetary  policy.  Debt  management  was  increasingly  seen  as  an
instance of portfolio management having distinct objectives  in terms of cost minimization
within risk limits.  In an attempt to increase the efficiency of debt management,  a number
of govermments  delegated  the  operational  dimensions  of debt  management  to  separate
debt management  offices (SDMOs).
I  The  authors  are with the  World Bank.  Currie  and  Togo are  Senior Financial  Officers  mn  the Public
Debt Management Group in the Treasury,  and Dethier is Senior Economist  in the Office of the Senior Vice
President  and  Chuef Economist.  The  usual  disclaimer  applies.  The  authors  are  very  grateful  to Phillip
Anderson,  Punam Chuhan, Fred Jensen,  Lars Jessen,  Tomas Magnusson and Antonio Velandia for detailed
comments  and suggestions.
5Other OECD countries did not see the need for a separation between DMO and Ministry
of Finance  and questioned  whether it was  advisable  to  operationally  isolate public debt
management  from public policy.  These countries  favor a balance between public policy
focus  and  focus  on  financial  portfolio  management  in  their  approach  to  debt
management.  Though debt management  functions  remained in the Ministry of Finance,
existing  departments  were consolidated and modernized  and clear objectives,  guidelines
and accountability mechanisms were adopted.
Both DMOs  within  the Ministry  and  SDMOs  have  to  deal  with principal-agent  issues
arising from delegation of authority, but these problems are more acute in separate  offices
since  agency  risks  increase-and  agency  agreement  and  control  mechanism  must  be
specified more formally-with the degree of autonomy and separation  of the DMO from
the  Ministry.  Cross-country  experience  shows  that  successful  agency  arrangements
depend  in  part  on  the  degree  to  which  the  principal-agent  problems  arising  from
delegation  of authority  can  be  resolved.  Key  considerations  are  (a)  how  well  the
objectives  of the  DMO  can be specified;  (b) whether  the agent  is offered an  incentive-
compatible  contract;  and (c)  to what extent the agent can be monitored and performance
can  be measured.  The  paper describes  and  discusses  governance  structures  set up by
various OECD countries that have been successful in resolving these issues.
Emerging  market  economies  and  transition  economies  generally  have  four  major
characteristics:  developing  domestic  debt  markets,  problems  in  coordinating  debt
management  with monetary policy,  problems in analyzing  and controlling the impact of
debt  servicing on  the budget,  and  in controlling  contingent liabilities.  These countries
generally  do not have the control and accountability mechanisms  needed for establishing
a  separate  debt  management  office,  and  there  is  a  high  degree  of interdependence
between  debt  management  and  macroeconomic  policies.  Given  these  characteristics,
modernization  of  the  DMO-within-the-MoF  model  would  seem  to  be  the  most
appropriate.  However, other constraints, such as extremely low salaries in the Ministries
and  the  consequent  inability  to  attract  staff with  the right  skill  set  under existing  civil
service  structures  are  also  important  considerations.  Establishing  a  separate  DMO  is
attractive for some countries because it allows them to recruit and retain competent staff.
Establishing  a  separate  DMO  also  has  the  advantage  of forcing  the  rationalization  of
public  debt  management,  and  of setting up  clear  govemance  and  reporting  structures.
The type of institutional arrangements  for public debt management that are best suited for
each  specific  country situation  and the trade-offs that are involved  need to  be analyzed
carefully.
The OECD experience  clearly indicates that-regardless of whether the DMO is located
inside  or outside  the  Ministry of Finance-four  issues  are of vital  importance:  giving
priority  to  strategic  public  policy  objectives  rather  than  tactical  trading  objectives;
strengthening  the institutional  capacity  to  deal  with financial  portfolio management  and
with the public policy aspects  of debt management;  modernizing debt management,  and
creating mechanisms to ensure successful delegation and accountability to the Ministry of
Finance and Parliament.
6INTRODUCTION
The impetus for writing this paper was a proposal by an Eastern European government to
create  a  separate  debt  management  office  outside  of the  Ministry  of Finance.  The
Minister  of Finance  viewed  it  as  the  best  arrangement  to  strengthen  public  debt
management  given  the  dynamism  of financial  markets,  to  entrust  debt  management  to
highly qualified specialists, to optimize the cost of debt servicing and to make the process
of debt management  more transparent.  The proposal  also included the suggestion that the
office  actively manage  the  debt vis-a-vis  a benchmark  established  by the  government,
and that cost savings versus the benchmark be reflected in salary rewards  for the staff.
The governments  of many emerging  market and transition  countries  seeking to improve
their debt management have made similar proposals. They were elaborated  in a context of
growing  awareness  of the  need  to  reduce  their  country's  vulnerability  to  international
financial  shocks,  following  the  debt  crises  that have  affected  several  emerging  market
countries.2 An issue which arises in this context  is where to locate the debt management
office, and whether it is necessary to create a separate debt management office (SDMO).
The  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  have  published,  in  2001,  Guidelines  for  Public  Debt
Management.  They  summarize  the  areas  in which  there  is  widespread  agreement  on
elements  of sound  debt  management  practice  and  are  designed  to  help  governments
strengthen  the quality of their public  debt management.  The  institutional  framework  for
public debt management  is one of the topics  addressed  in the Guidelines.  The latter stress
the importance of a clearly specified organizational  framework,  the need for coordination
and  sharing  of information  among  macroeconomic  advisors,  and  the  need  for  clear
mandates  for  the  respective  players.  With  regard to  the  location  of debt  management
office  (DMO),  however,  the  Guidelines  mention  the  multiplicity  of arrangements  that
,exist around the world:
Experience  suggests that there is a range of mstitutional alternatives for locating the sovereign
debt  management  functions  across  one  or  more  agencies,  including  in one  or  more  of the
following:  the ministry  of finance,  central bank, autonomous  debt management agency,  and
central depository.
In  the  1990s,  several  OECD governments  established  separate  debt management  offices
outside of the Ministry of Finance.  At the time, this type of arrangement was considered
best practice by some authors.  For example,  Cassard and Folkerts-Landau  (1997)  argued
that
An  efficient,  transparent  and accountable  debt  management policy necessitates  an organizational
structure  independent  from polhtical  influence,  with clearly  defined objectives  and  performance
2The emerging  market  debt crises of the  1990s-characterized  by vulnerabilities  arising  from poor debt
structures  and  realization of contingent  liabilities-include  the  1994  Mexican  crisis,  the Asian  crisis  of
1997-98,  the Russian  crisis of 1998  and the Brazilian crisis of 1998-99.
7criteria,  and run by quahfied staff,  according  to sound nsk management principles.  A number of
countries  (e.g.  Austria,  Belgium,  Ireland,  New Zealand,  Portugal  and  Sweden)  have  concluded
that,  to achieve  such  objectives,  debt agencies with some  degree  of autonomy  from the political
sphere should be set up.  Specifically, the formulation  of debt policy (e.g., level of the debt, limits
on domestic-  and foreign-currency borrowing)  is a political  decision  and therefore  should rest in
the  hands  of the  government.  The  actual  management of the  sovereign  debt, however,  can be
extracted from the political domain and assigned to a separate and autonomous  debt management
office (DMO).  Under this arrangement,  the Ministry of Finance defines the medium-term strategy
for debt management  - based on its objectives  and risk-preferences,  and the macroeconomic  and
institutional constraints of the country - while the DMO implements that strategy and administers
the issuance of the domestic and foreign-currency debt.
Strictly speaking, Austria,  Ireland, Portugal,  Sweden,  Germany,  Hungary, and the United
Kingdom have a public debt management  office that is separate from-but in a principal-
agent relationship with-the Ministry of Finance.3 We  refer to such offices as separate
debt  management  offices  (SDMOs),4 i.e.,  govermment  agencies  responsible  for  the
operational  management  of  the  government  debt,  located  outside  of the  Ministry  of
Finance.5 In  turn,  Belgium  and  New  Zealand  together  with  Australia,  France,  the
Netherlands,  USA,  Canada  and Poland have DMOs that are located  within the Ministry
of Finance,  even  though  in some cases  they bear the name of 'agency'.6 They have an
institutionally consolidated  and  specialized  debt management  office  with a clear system
of delegation of authority from the Minister to the Head of the unit in charge of the debt.
A  recent  OECD  publication  documents  the  multiplicity  of institutional  locations  and
arrangements  and argues  that DMOs should primarily be responsible  for the operational
aspects of debt management.
3  Finland has a  somewhat  similar arrangement,  but the  debt management  functions  are placed within the
larger  State  Treasury,  which  is  a  multiple  service  bureau  that  handles  the  State's  internal  finance  and
treasury administration,  including operational fiscal responsibilities.
4  We prefer to use  the  term  'separate'  rather than  'independent'  OT  'autonomous'  (both terms are  often
used  interchangeably)  because  the autonomy of these offices  is limited to a strictly operational  dimension.
The  Ministry  of Finance  is always  the  entity  responsible  for  developing  and  recommending  an  overall
public  debt  management  strategy.  The  Council  of Ministers  approve  the  strategy and  the  SDMO  must
follow it.  In some cases  the SDMO is  given some  leeway for deviating  from those guidelines  in order to
seek greater cost efficiencies,  but these deviations are usually limited and strictly controlled.
5  This  was  first described  by  Magnusson  (2001)  who refers  to  the  SDMO  as  the  "Autonomous  Debt
Office" and to the DMO within the Ministry of Finance as the "Debt Office".
6  The term Ministry of Finance  is used here to designate the government's principal  economic advisor.  It
is  the  body  responsible  for preparng  the  budget  and  coordinating  fiscal  policies,  for  supervising  the
implementation  of the budget and for rendering  accounts on national  revenue  and expenditure,  assets  and
debts.  We  reserve  the  term  Treasury  to refer to  an agency  whose  mandate  is  to  optimize  the  financial
management  of  government  operations.  This  can  include  cash  and  debt  management,  accountmg,
maintenance  of government  financial information  systems  and other functions.  The exact mandate  of the
Treasury in a particular country depends on the economic  situation of  the country,  its historical and cultural
traditions,  and the  balance  of powers  between  different  government  agencies  responsible  for economic
management.
8"An  increasing  number  of  OECD  goverrnents  are  giving  the  operational arm  for  debt
management  greater mdependence.  The  emphasis  is on more autonomy  for the execution  of debt
management policies  by debt management  offices.  In spite  of the diversity  in terms of location
anid  other  institutional  features  of DMOs,  there  is  general  agreement  that  DMOs  should  have
sufficient  autonomy  from the political sphere  and that they should be principally  concerned with
the operational  aspects of the management  of sovereign debt" (OECD 2001).
While  the  benefits  of  giving  the  operational  arm  for  debt  management  greater
independence  have  been  discussed  in that paper,  existing literature  does not refer to  its
implications  for  organizational  arrangements.  In  particular,  when  operational
independence  is  accompanied  by  institutional  separation  between  the  DMO  and  the
MOF, there needs to be in place a clear medium term strategy,  performance indicator  and
strict monitoring and control functions in place, particularly if the DMO is to engage in
tactical trading.  The SDMO of Sweden has recently argued that debt must be seen as part
of the  government's balance  sheet, where strategic  decisions are closely linked to fiscal
and budget policies and therefore,  that a debt office with independence similar to that of
an autonomous  central bank may not only lack the necessary  information  to make such
assessments, but may not be held accountable for decisions that are ultimately political in
nature  (World Bank/IMF 2002).  Most SDMOs in OECD countries have been  successful
in  implementing  those  safeguards.  This  helps  explain  why  there  are  multiplicity  of
organizational  arrangements  and why  DMOs  located  in  the  Ministry  of Finance  is  as
good as the SDMOs in OECD countries.
Others  have  questioned  the desirability  of granting the debt management  office  greater
independence  and/or separation in developing countries.  They argue  that, in developing
countries,  the  establishment  of  separate  debt  management  offices  would  complicate
rather  than  facilitate  the  development  of the  various  debt  management  functions.  For
example,  Blejer  (1999)  argued  that  for  countries  in which  financial  markets  are  just
beginning  to  develop,  it was  advisable  to  keep the main debt management  functions  in
the Ministry  of Finance  in close  collaboration  with the  central  bank.  Kalderen  (1997)
also suggested  that, under  such conditions,  a separate  debt office may complicate  rather
than  assist  the  coordinated  development  of  the  broader  debt  management  functions,
including development of the domestic debt market.
This paper takes  one step back and examines  the rationales  that are put forward to justify
the  choice  of location  of DMOs  and  other  institutional  arrangements  for  public  debt
management.  Section  1 describes the evolution of objectives, priorities  and institutions of
public  debt management  in the  last two  decades  in selected  OECD  countries.  Section 2
describes  the  principal-agent  issues  that arise  from the  management  of the  public  debt
and describes  the various institutional arrangements  that OECD countries have adopted to
ensure that effective delegation  of authority takes place.  This tends to be a more critical
issue  when the debt management  office is  separate  from the Ministry  of Finance  since
their greater autonomy and separation require more formal agency agreement  and control
mechanisms.  Implications for governments  in emerging market and  transition economies
that  are  considering  upgrading  their  debt  management  organization  are  also  drawn.
Finally,  conclusions are presented in the last section.
91.  EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT
AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Growing public debt levels, the trend towards greater independence  of central banks  and
changes in the objectives and priorities of public debt policy in OECD countries over the
last two decades  have influenced  the  choice  of institutional  arrangements  for managing
the public debt.  Although there  are  recurring  policy issues  that these  governments  may
have had  to  address,  the evolution  has not been  identical  for  all countries inasmuch  as
organizational  arrangements  and the process  of organizational  change was influenced by
local  institutions  and  traditions,  economic  conditions,  and  circumstances  such  as  the
creation of the European Union.
Until  the  late  1980s,  public  debt  management tended  to be considered  an extension  of
monetary policy, and was dispersed throughout the public sector.  During the 1990s, debt
management  was  increasingly  recognized  as  a  separate  public  policy  having  separate
objectives based on cost-risk trade-offs.  Some OECD  countries  opted for  separate  debt
management  offices  as  the  most  appropriate  institutional  arrangement  to  improve
operational  efficiency.  Other OECD  countries  sought  a more  explicit balance between
public policy and financial management  considerations,  and opted for keeping the DMO
within the Ministry of Finance.
DEBT MANAGEMENT AS  AN OPERATIONAL  EXTENSION  OF MONETARY  POLICY
Expansionary  macroeconomic  policy  of the  late  1960s  and  1970s  led  to  rising  fiscal
deficits  and  high  debt  levels,  and  OECD  governments  became  increasingly  concerned
about inflation and fiscal sustainability.  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the debt/GDP
ratio  of  Ireland,  Belgium  and  Italy  had  exceeded  100%.  In  Sweden,  the  central
government  debt  level  increased  from 46% of GDP  in  1991  to  82%  in  1995,  while in
Denmark it rose from 64%  in 1991  to 80%  in 1993.  At its peak in  1992, the public  debt
level of  New Zealand reached 63% of GDP.
As debt levels rose, their implications  for inflation became the central topic. In the early
days,  inflation financing was an option and debt management  was often seen not only as
a choice between  different  debt  instruments,  but also between  debt issuance or inflation
11financing.7 Those  who  expressed  concern  that  high  debt  levels  would  cause  high
inflation argued  that, were current fiscal policy to continue,  the gap between current  and
future  deficits  on  the  one  hand  and  current  and  future  primary  surpluses  on the  other
hand, would have to be somehow  financed.  If sustainability became  an issue, a cap would
be placed  on  debt issuance  and  the central bank  would  eventually  be forced to  fill  this
financing  gap  through  seigniorage.  Thus,  if  central  banks  stopped  financing  the
government, the argument went, the linkage between high debt levels and inflation would
be cut off and the government would be  forced to fill the financing  gap by changing its
fiscal policy stance and reducing the deficit.
This thinking  led to clear and narrow  price stability objectives  for central banks,  to their
greater  independence  from  the  government  and  to  the  prohibition  for  central  banks  to
finance the fiscal deficit.  Debt issuance  to parties  other than the central bank became the
sole formal way to finance the deficit. This was also the logic under which the Maastricht
Treaty forbade  overdraft facilities  and other types of credit facilities for governments,  or
the direct purchase of government securities in the primary market by the future ECB or
EU central banks.
Central bank  independence  did  not  necessarily  entail  debt  management  independence.
Debt management  was still being used in some countries  to achieve monetary goals.  For
example,  in Sweden, from the Second World War until the mid-1980s,
debt  management  was,  to  a large  degree,  part of the  monetary  policy  of the  Riksbank  and the
economic  policy  of the  government  [in  an  environment  of repressed  domestic  financing  and
controlled interest rates].  Banks  and insurance  compames  were forced to invest a substantial part
of their assets  in bonds issued  by priority sectors,  that is, the state  and the  mortgage  institutions.
The  interest  rates  on  these  loans  were  determined  by the  Riksbank  at  a level  lower  than  the
prevailing  market price.  In practice,  debt  operations  and  more  precisely the  setting of interest
rates on state  bond loans,  were regarded as one of the most important tools in monetary policy  as
borrowing  from the  large domestic institutions  formed a part of the pnority credit  system. (Crona
1997)
This  kind  of intervention  by the  central  bank  in public  debt  management  also  created
distortions in the debt market.
In  New  Zealand,  central  bankers  saw  the  potential  for  using  government  debt
management  to strengthen  the credibility  of monetary policy.  For  example,  the  central
bank  promoted  the  issuance  of foreign  currency  debt  in  order  to  send  signals  on  its
commitment  to  defend  the  domestic  currency.  However,  such  actions  created  greater
financial  risk  for the  government,  which  derived  the  bulk of its revenues  in domestic
currency,  and this was in conflict with the cost/risk objectives of debt management.
7  See  for  example,  Sargent  (1986).  Decisions  about  the  composition  of the  debt-between  bonds  of
different matunties  and currency or high powered money-are,  at each pomt in time,  under the control of
the monetary authority.
12The  literature  discussing  the  interface  between  monetary policy  and  debt management
discusses possible conflicts of interests when the central bank is responsible for both.8 In
theory, a central bank with dual mandate  for conducting monetary policy and debt policy
- may  be  reluctant  to  increase  interest  rates  to  control  inflationary  pressure  since  it
would have an adverse effect on its domestic liability portfolio.
- may  be  tempted  to  manipulate  financial  markets  to  reduce  interest  rates  at  which
government debt is issued or to inflate away the value of nominal debt.
- may be tempted  to inject liquidity in the market prior to debt refinancing,  or to bias
the maturity structure  or the  currency composition of the debt portfolio  according to
the stance of its monetary policy.
Even if debt  management  is handled by a  separate  department  within the  central bank,
there is a risk that debt management decisions could be perceived  as being influenced by
inside  information  on interest  rate  decisions.  In  that  case,  neither  monetary  policy nor
debt management policy would be optimal.
For example,  in the UK prior to 1997,  debt management was carried out by the Bank of
England.  The publicly  stated objective  was to support and complement  monetary policy
while avoiding  distortions  in financial markets,  and to  fund public  expenditures  at  least
cost and risk.  The  need to  avoid possible  conflicts  of interests-and  the  appearance  of
possible  conflicts of interests-between  debt  management  and monetary  policy led the
government  to  take  debt  management  out  of the  central  bank  and  to  give  it  separate
objectives.
Thus, it became  an accepted  fact that a separation of responsibilities between  the central
bank and the MoF was desirable because  the two institutions had different concerns  with
regard to debt.  However,  this was  a gradual process in most countries.  In New Zealand,
for  instance, when the  Debt Management  Office  was  created  in  1988,  the  central bank
continued  to  intervene  in  debt  management  policy  until  the  mid-90s  as  a  way  of
signalling  its  monetary  policy.  The  process  of  preventing  the  central  bank  from
influencing  debt  management  policy  in  order  to  further  price  stability  objectives  took
place  at different paces  in different  countries.  In some  cases, it was  a very slow process
and there remained  an overlap  in responsibilities  and policies.  The UK has been one of
the clearest cases of separation (Box 1).
8  For a detailed  description  of the  potential conflict of interests,  see  Jensen and  Wheeler  (forthcoming),
Blejer (1999) and Sundararajan,  Dattel and Blomrnestein (1997).
13BOX 1. Transferring  Debt Management out of the Central Bank in the United
Kingdom
The Bank of England has been traditionally responsible for the Governmnent's  cash and debt
management.  In May 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that these responsibilities
would be transferred to the Treasury  while the operational responsibility  for setting interest rates
would be transferred to the Bank of England.  This decision followed the  1995 Debt Management
Review which, in a distinctive break from past policy, indicated that debt management was not a
major tool of monetary policy.
A DMO was established on  1 Apnl  1998  as an executive agency of the Treasury, and was given
operational  responsibility  for debt management, working within a policy framework set by the
Treasury.  The transfer of responsibility for cash management  to the DMO was completed on 3
April 2000. The Treasury offered three reasons for the transfer of debt management from the
Bank of England  to the DMO:
1.  The need to prevent inside information, particularly  on monetary policy, from influencing debt
management  policy. Policy decision and implementation  "should be, and should be seen to be"
unaffected by short-term monetary policy considerations.  The subsequent decision to establish
the DMO as an executive agency ensured that it did not have advance access to other policy
decisions or the output of the Office for National  Statistics (except in relation to the Government's
financmg needs).
2.  Possible  conflicts of interest between debt management  and monetary policy which could
undermine the achievement of the debt management  objective of minimizing the cost of
Government financing subject to risk.
3.  A need to create a clearer allocation of the responsibilities  for debt management and
monetary  policy was a "key factor in shaping the new ... arrangements".
The decision to transfer debt management from the Bank of England to the DMO was not the
result of suspicions in the markets that actual conflicts of interest with monetary policy had
arisen, or that debt management  policy were being driven by inappropriate  short-term
considerations.  The primary reasons for the change were the need for debt management to be seen
to be separate from monetary policy,  and for accountability and responsibility for debt
management  to be crystal  clear.
The reasons given for transferring  cash management  from the Bank of England to the DMO were
similar to those  cited in relation to the transfer of debt management.  In particular,  the Treasury
believed that "money market operations need to be distinguished from those involving
Government cash management to avoid confusion over monetary policy signals".  Thus, as with
the transfer of debt management,  an important consideration was the need for cash management
arrangements to be seen to be  free of conflicts  of interest  or of influence from  inside information.
Source:  HM Treasury,  Select Committee Report (2000)
14DEBT MANAGEMENT  AS PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
Even  after  central  banks  stopped  expressing  views  on  debt  policy,  in many  OECD
countries  debt  management  lacked  guidance  and  had  no  explicit,  structured  debt
management  strategy.  While there was a general awareness of refinancing risks (e.g. the
bunching of maturities) and of the impact of floating rate debt and foreign currency debt,
there was no  systematic  approach to deciding on the  overall portfolio  structure of debt.
Debt  management  was  effectively  limited  to  the  narrow  operational  areas  of  debt
issuance  and  debt  servicing-corresponding  to  front  and  back  office  functions,
respectively.9 These functions  were often dispersed among  different  institutions  and/or
among different departments  within the Ministry of Finance.
As high debt levels became  a central political concern,  fiscal  rules were also introduced
to limit deficit and debt. In Europe, this was considered essential to lend credibility to the
introduction of the new European currency, the Euro.  For instance,  a 60 percent debt-to-
GDP  stock target  and a 3 percent deficit-to-GDP  flow target were enshrined in the  1992
Maastricht  Treaty.  New Zealand  adopted  in  1994  the Fiscal Responsibility  Act which
made the government responsible  and accountable  for reducing the debt to GDP ratio to
prudent  levels  over a defined  time horizon.  In many  OECD countries,  the volatility of
debt  service payments,  which  represented  a large  share  of the budget, became  a major
issue and thus, improving the management  of currency and interest rate risks, as well as
reducing the cost of debt servicing, became high priorities.
The  high-risk  profile  of various  OECD  debt  portfolios  led  to  a  re-definition  of the
mandate  and objectives  of debt management,  from performing passive debt issuance and
servicing  functions,  towards  systematic  management  of the  risks  inherent  in the  debt
structure  so  as not to jeopardize the  achievement of the fiscal targets  and to reduce the
vulnerability  to shocks  of government  finance.  This  shift in thinking was pioneered by
New  Zealand,  Ireland,  Denmark,  Finland  and  Sweden-a  set  of  countries  which
redefined debt management in important ways.
This  new  orientation  initially  led debt  managers  in these  countries  to  mimic  portfolio
management practices  in the private  sector.  These practices  indicated  that cost and risk
reduction  was  possible  through  diversification  of  the  foreign  currency  portfolio.
Furthermore,  active  trading  of the  foreign  currency liability  portfolio was  viewed  as  a
viable  alternative  that did not affect the market  (this was the "little  fish in a big pond"
theory - see Sullivan 1999).  It was therefore felt that this dimension of debt management
should be carried out by portfolio management  professionals.  However,  these countries
found it hard to attract professionals with such skills to work as civil servants when they
9  There  are  usually  three  mam  types  of functions  m  a  DMO,  each  with  distmct  accountabilities  and
separate reporting  lines (World Banki/LMF 2001).  The front office is typically responsible  for funding and,
sometimes,  tradmg  operations.  The  middle  office  is  responsible  for  analysis  and  advice  on  the debt
management  strategy,  as  well as  for the  more  operational  role  of implementing  risk controls,  especially
important  if the  front  office  is  involved  in  active  trading  or taking  speculative  positions  vis-a-vis  the
government  guidelines.  The  back  office  is  responsible  for  settlement  of transactions  and  for  debt
registration and payments.
15could find employment  in the private sector at salaries that were much higher than what
the public sector could pay.
Ireland,  Sweden  and Denmark  therefore  opted  for the  SDMO model,  placing it outside
the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  staffing  it  with  financial  specialists  with  experience  in
portfolio  risk  management.' 0 SDMOs,  with  operational  autonomy  and  better  paid
professionals,  were  thought to  be better than ministerial  departments  at  achieving  cost
savings. The latter would be generated through efficient funding operations and the active
trading of government debt  (e.g.  using buy-backs  and  swaps).  It was assumed that they
would operate better because they followed private sector, market-oriented principles and
that,  since they did not have to comply with bureaucratic  procedures,  they would create
an environment appropriate for quick decision-making.  The government would retain the
principal's  function of choosing the  general  strategy  for debt management-though  the
latter would be based on risk management  models prepared by the middle office of the
SDMOs.
In Ireland,  based on recommendations  from private  sector banking consultants,  an entity
separate  from the  Ministry of Finance  was created  by legislation enacted  in  1990.  The
National  Treasury  Management  Agency  (NTMA)  was  established  because  "debt
management  had  become  an  increasingly  complex  and  sophisticated  activity,  requiring
flexible  management  structures  and  suitably  qualified  personnel  to  exploit  fully  the
potential  for  savings"  (NTMA  2002).  It  was  argued  that an organization  which  could
operate  along  commercial  lines  and  with  the  freedom  to  hire  experienced  staff would
exhibit a more professional  management  than would be possible within the constraints  of
the civil service system. "  I
Ireland  was  practically  the  only  country  where  the  SDMO  had  active  trading  in the
domestic  debt market (Irish pounds) vis-a-vis  a performance  benchmark.  Other countries
felt  that  it  was  not  meaningful  to  outperform  a  domestic  debt  benchmark  since  the
government's  overwhelming  presence in its own domestic currency  market would affect
the outcome of the benchmark  itself.'2 While  Sweden and Denmark also actively traded
against a benchmark,  they did so only with foreign currency debt.13
°  The case of Dennark is unique m that the central bank has taken over all debt management functions.
I  IThe  main reasons  behind  the  decision  to  establish the  NTMA  were outlined  as  follows  by the  MOF
when  the  legislation  was  presented  to  Parliament  in  1990:  "It  has become  increasingly  clear  that  the
executive  and commercial  operations  of borrowing  and  debt management  require  an  increasing  level  of
specialization  and  are  no long  appropriate  to  a Govermnent  Department.  Also,  with  the  growth of the
financial services sector in Dublm, the Department (of Finance] has been losing staff that are qualified and
experienced  in the financial  area and it has not been possible  to recruit suitable  staff from elsewhere.  ... [in
the agency]  there will be flexibility  as to pay and conditions  so that key staff can be recruited  and retained;
in return,  they will be assigned  clear levels  of responsibility  and must perforrn to these levels:  the  agency's
staff will not be civil servants."
12  This has changed  for some  European  countries  with  the introduction  of the  Euro,  since these countries
have  now become  small players  in a large market, but  the  point is still valid  for countries  that are in the
process of developing their own domestic market.
16The  Swedish National  Debt Office  (SNDO)  - or Riksgaldskontoret - has  traditionally
been outside of the government,  reporting directly to Parliament since  1789.  Governance
arrangements  were modified  in 1989  so that the  SNDO would report to the Minister of
Finance.  This  was  followed  by  changes  in  operational  policy with  the  objective  of
reducing the burden of Sweden's  external  debt  following the EMS crisis in  1992.  Cost
savings  from management of the foreign currency portfolio were measured by comparing
real performance  to a benchmark.
In the early  1990s,  SDMO arrangements  were viewed  as best practice.  The justification
for  SDMOs  was  framed  in  terms  of  technical  efficiency,  professionalism  and
accountability  which,  it was argued,  would materialize if the  SDMO could be separated
from "the political process."' 4 It was argued that separating operational  debt management
from government decreased the risk that politicians use debt management  as a vehicle for
opportunistic  reductions  in debt servicing costs-and therefore  in the budget  deficit-in
the  short term.  The need  for isolation  from the politicians  arose  from the possibility of
political  pressures  on the  DMOs  to fund  cheaply  in the near term,  even if this  implied
greater risk  (e.g. short  term,  floating  interest rate  and/or  in a currency with low  coupon
rate),  and it also arose from the need for greater flexibility and efficiency.
In Denmark, the decision was taken in 1991  to move the debt office out of the Ministry of
Finance  to the Central  Bank acting  as agent  for the MOF,  while the accountability  to
Parliament  for central  government  borrowing  remained  with  the  MOF.  The  decision
followed  the  release of a report from  the Auditor  General  which  indicated that most of
the assignments related to central  government debt were already being carried out by the
central bank - and that a stronger coordination between the management  of the foreign
exchange  reserves and foreign currency  debt would be advisable.  The Auditor General's
report  suggested  that,  from  an  Assets-Liabilities  Management  (ALM)  perspective,  it
made  sense  to try  to  match  the  currency  composition  of the  debt  with  the  currency
composition  of the currency reserves  since  this nets out the currency  risk (see Box  2). 15
The report also suggested  that attracting  and maintaining staff with the skills relevant  to
the  debt office  would  be easier if it were  located  in  the central  bank.  As  a  result,  the
central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, was made responsible  for all functions  related to
government  debt  management.  The  division of responsibility  was  set  out  in  a  formal
agreement between  the Ministry of Finance and the Nationalbank.  By power of attorney,
13  Active trading  m the  domestic market to "beat the benchmark"  is an additional reason why  separation
from the MOF  is needed so as to not be associated  with "insider  trading" and not take away transparency
from the domestic market (see section 2 below).
14  Cassard and Folkerts-Landau (1997) contain a detailed description of the benefits of SDMOs.
15  A more detailed discussion of the ALM framework is provided in the next section.
17officials  from  the  Nationalbank authorized  to  sign  loan  documents  on  behalf of the
Minister of Finance. 1 6 This was a unique case of a SDMO located in the central bank.
Box 2. Cooirlinated Management  of Exchange Rate  EUsk in  Denmnark
In  Denmark,  the  purpose  of  foreign  borrowing  is  to  maintain  an  adequate  level  of foreign
exchange  reserves  and to refinance  existing foreign debt.  Budget deficits  are financed solely by
domestic borrowing.
Prior to  the  introduction  of coordinated  management  in  1992,  situations  could  arise  where  the
central  government borrowed  in one currency  and the Nationalbank  made placements in another.
Since  the purpose  of foreign  borrowing  is  to  ensure  adequate  foreign  exchange  reserves,  the
central  government's  foreign borrowing  is offset by an equivalent  increase  in foreign  exchange
reserves.  If  the  currency  distribution  of  the  central  government's  foreign  debt  and  foreign
exchange  reserves  are  not coordinated,  the  consequence  may  be  that  for  certain  periods  the
central  government  and  the Nationalbank  taken  as  one  are  exposed  to a  large  and  fluctuating
exchange-rate  risk.  The  Auditor  General  thus  remarked  in  his  1991  report  that  "in  the
management of the foreign debt by the Government Debt Office, it appears that no consideration
is given to the composition of the Nationalbank's  foreign-exchange  reserve".
Between  1992  and  2000,  the  exchange-rate  risk  on  the  central  government's  foreign  debt  and
Danmarks  Nationalbank's  foreign  exchange  reserves  was  subject  to  coordinated  management
with the objective of limiting total exchange-rate  risk.
With  the  reduction  of gross  exchange  rate  exposures  in  currencies  other than  the  Euro,  and
thereby of gross exchange rate risk by the central  government and Danmarks Nationalbank,  it was
decided  that,  starting  in  2001,  the  central  government's  foreign  debt  would  be  exposed
exclusively  to  the  Euro,  and  the  Nationalbank's  exchange  rate risk  exposure  via  the  foreign
exchange  reserve  would  be predominantly  in Euro-thus  continuing  to minimize  the net debt
exposure to movements in foreign currency.
Source:  Danmarks Nationalbank 2000, Chapter 8.
During  the  decade  of the  1990s,  various  countries  including  Portugal,  Austria  and
Hungary  followed  the  example  of Ireland  and  Sweden,  creating  what  can  be  called
"second generation SDMOs" with debt offices outside the Ministry of Finance.  The cases
of Portugal and Hungary are discussed in Boxes 3 and 4.
16  Part of the reason that it has been possible for Denmark to have an efficient debt management operation
within  the  central  banks  rests with  the objective  of monetary  policy which  essentially  is to keep  a stable
exchange  rate  vis-a-vis  the Euro.  This  fixed exchange  rate  policy,  which have  been in place  since  1982,
implies that the monetary policy is strongly connected to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank
(and previously to the Bundesbank).  This defacto fixed exchange rate policy has been the main reason why
debt policy has not interfered  with monetary  policy.  To support the  separation of monetary policy and debt
policy,  a fundmg rule has been in place  since  1982 according to which the funding need of the state have to
be  covered  by borrowing  in the  financial  markets.  Finally,  there  is a  very strong  tradition  of openness
regarding all aspects of debt management.
18BOX 3.  Debt Management and EMU: The Case of Portugal
Between  1995 and  1998, debt managers in Portugal were concerned  with managing convergence
to join the Economic and Monetary Union, then with preparations to join the single currency.  The
management  of  convergence  attempted  to  reconcile  several  objectives:  positioning  the  debt
portfolio to take advantage of the expected reduction of interest rates,  particularly in the domestic
market (due to  the narrowing of the differential  between  foreign and domestic rates);  protecting
the portfolio  and the Budget from domestic money market turbulence  linked to the exchange  rate
stabilisation  process;  and promoting  the  domestic  capital  market  and  ensure a  more  active  and
flexible management  of the debt portfolio.  In  order to  take advantage  of the decline  in interest
rates,  the  strategy was to maintain  a short financial  duration and  to resort  whenever  possible  to
external  financing in EMS core currencies.
The preparations  to join  "Euroland"  led to  the  creation  in  1996  of the Portuguese  Govemment
Debt  Agency  (IGCP),  a  separate  agency  structured  according  to  the  model  of a  financial
institution.  In  this,  Portugal  followed  the  pioneering  example  of Sweden  and Ireland.  All  the
functions  connected  with public  debt management  and State financing,  formerly  assigned to  the
Directorate-General  of the  Treasury  (DGT)  - responsible  for  external  debt and  for  short-term
domestic debt except for savings certificates - and to the Public Credit Board (JCP) - responsible
for the remaining government debt - were transferred to the IGCP.
The  transition  between  both  institutional  systems  and  the full  operation  of IGCP  was  pursued
gradually over three years in order to avoid disturbances in debt management  or in the operation
of the relevant markets.  The first year, 1997, witnessed the physical  installation of the agency, the
definition of procedures  and of the management  framework,  the promotion of the image of the
new institution,  and the gradual  transfer of the functions  formerly assigned to DGT and  to JCP.
The second year,  1998, saw the reorganization  of the internal  structure of the Agency, taking the
different  operational  "pieces"  inherited  from the  former  structures  and  attempting  to transform
them into an organizational  model as close as possible to the "ideal"i  mstitutional model. The last
year,  1999, coincided with joining the competitive  environment brought about by the introduction
of the Euro. Having reached cruising speed, the emphasis was on optimising internal efficiency,
leading to the introduction of an Integrated  and Automated Information  System, the creation of a
benchmark  to evaluate  debt management,  and the clarification of the terms of the "management
contract"  with  the  Government,  materialized  in  the  publication  of  Guidelines  which  set
boundaries on the autonomy of debt management by the IGCP.
Source:  Bento (2000)
19BOX 4.  Public Debt Management Reforms  in  Hiungmary
In  1996,  Hungary  reformed  its  public  finance  management  system  creatmg  two  important
institutions  to  improve  budget  execution  and  debt  operations:  the  Treasury  and  the  Debt
Management  Agency  (Allamad6ssaig Kezelo Kozpont,  AKK).  The  AKK prepares  the financing
strategy  of the  Treasury,  which  is  approved  by  the  Ministry  of Finance,  and  carries  out  the
borrowing  decisions.  It has two  other  important functions:  organizing  the domestic  market and
providing  information  for  market  participants.  The  management  of the  foreign  portion of the
public debt was transferred from the National  Bank of Hungary (NBH) to the AKK in 1997, after
one year of discussions  and preparations.
The  Hunganan  State  Treasury  started  functioning  on  January  1,  1996.  It  is  an  mdependent
organization  operating under the  supervision of the Minister of Finance. In practice, the Treasury
and its branch network was built around budget implementation  functions which were carried out
by  the  State  Development  Institute  and  the NBH.  The  ledger  system  of NBH,  contaming  the
accounts  of government  agencies,  was transferred  to the  Treasury.  To  facilitate  the recruitment
and  retention  of  qualified  staff,  the  Treasury  obtained  a  special  salary  scale  for  its  public
employees  and  absorbed  experienced  professionals  from  the  State  Development  Institute,  the
NBH and its  19 county directorates.
In March  2001, in a move to modernize debt management,  AKK was established as a joint stock
company,  organizationally  independent but under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.  The
tasks of the new agency  include,  among others, the  fine-tuning of instruments for the issuing of
public  debt,  and  the  systematic  use  of benchmarking  in  order  to  minimize  risk  and  costs
associated  with  securities,  both  denominated  in  HIU?F  and  in  foreign  exchange.  The  AKK
monitors debt risks  in order to ensure the long term sustamability of the Hungarian debt.
Sources: Hungarian  Government Debt Management Agency Ltd.,  http://www.allampapir.hu  and
Biuzas, Hungarian Public Debt Management,  http://www.worldbank.org/pdm/ndfIbuzas  debt.pdf
New Zealand  also  overhauled  its public  debt  management.  Its objectives  and  functions
will  be  presented  in  the  following  section  to  show  its  preoccupation  with  balancing
portfolio management  with  clearly defined public  policy objectives.  However  it is useful
to  illustrate  at  this point  how, by creating  the  New  Zealand  Debt  Management  Office
(NZDMO),  the  government  consolidated  and  coordinated  functions  that  had  been
dispersed  in  different  parts  of the  Treasury-a  common  situation  in  many  countries
seeking to upgrade their public debt management  (see Box 5).
In other countries,  front  and back  office functionalities  for debt management  were spread
out not only within the Treasury, but typically scattered among different departments  and
organizations,  and  domestic  and  foreign  currency  debt  management  was  also  dispersed
under  different  management.  For  example,  in  Ireland  and  in  Denmark,  prior  to  the
creation  of NTMA  and  consolidation  of  debt  management  functions  in  Danmarks
Nationalbanken, respectively,  external  and  domestic  borrowing  were  split  between  the
Ministry of Finance and the central bank.
20BOX 5.  Dispersion of Functions and Responsibilities  before DMO Consolidation in
New Zealand
In New Zealand  during the  1980s,  debt  and cash management  decisions  were  taken by
three different parts  of the Treasury.  The debt management  functions  consisted of three loosely
coordinated  sub-functions  and were  contained within  groups that had other responsibilities.  The
group  responsible  for foreign  currency  debt and cash  management  also had responsibility  for a
number of public policy  issues;  the group  responsible  for NZ dollar  debt and cash management
also had responsibility  for advising on monetary policy;  and the group responsible  for monitoring
the Treasury's  bank accounts and  arranging  disbursements to  Government departments  also had
responsibility  for the Govemment's  financial statements  and accountIng operations.
Reporting responsibilities  vis-a-vis  the Minister  were  also  unclear.  The  groups  sought
the Minister's  approval  for the  strategy  to  be  followed  with  respect  to  currency,  interest  rate,
credit and liquidity  risks of the  portfolio,  but not on a systematic  basis.  This meant that,  while
debt  management  always  had  risk  management  guidelines  to  follow,  it  did  not  have  clear
responsibility to seek approval for a new strategy at regular intervals or when market movements
or  other  factors  warranted  a change  m  approach.  The  uncertainty  as to  the basis  for  seeking
Ministenal  approval for any modified strategy made accountability  very unclear in this regard.
Moreover, there were some significant gaps in Ministerial approvals.  For example,  credit
limits  were  not  defined  clearly,  especially  with  respect  to  the  aggregation  of credit  risk  for
different instruments.  These gaps created uncertainty as to the extent and nature of the portfolio's
exposure and how it should be mterpreted.  This,  in turn,  made it difficult for risk management to
be clear and decisive.
As a result of the above, the debt management  groups made  decisions in an environment
in which both accountability  relationships  within  the Treasury  and overall  accountability  to  the
Minister were unclear.
Perhaps  the  most  important  problem  with New  Zealand's  sovereign  debt management
functions in the early 1980s  was the fact  that its strategy  and reporting process  were not clearly
focused and articulated.  This meant that all those involved were uncertain, in various degrees,  as
to what they were supposed  to do, what they actually  did, why  they undertook certain activities,
and what  the  value of those  activities  was.  This  gave  rise to wide  differences  in expectations
regarding performance.
Since  debt  management  functions  were  dispersed  among  three  different  groups  in  the
Treasury, a mission statement did not exist as such and there was no formal business plan.
Source: Zohrab (1993)
In principle,  it should  matter little  whether debt management  functions  are dispersed  as
long as debt management objectives  were clearly defined and conveyed, and coordination
between  the different  departments  is effective.  But,  in practice,  as discussed  in Box  5,
organizational  dispersion  often  reflected  the  lack  of  a  coherent  debt  management
objective  or  mission  statement,  as  well  as  bureaucratic  rivalry  between  different
departments,  and  results  in  poor  coordination.  Furthermore,  dispersion  implied  higher
operational  risk  since  accountability  and  responsibility  are  not  aligned.  Finally,
organizational  dispersion  tends  to  be  reflected  in  a  lack  of  overall  strategic  risk
21orientation  among  debt  managers,  as  the  different  units  involved  focused  narrowly  on
their particular responsibilities.
In  several  countries,  such  lack  of clarity  in  the  objectives  and  the  existence  of inter-
departmental  and inter-institutional rivalry have been major obstacles  in carrying out debt
management  reforms.  There  is  now  increased  consensus  that  consolidating  debt
management  functions into one office is one of the most important steps that can be taken
to improve the overall quality of debt management,  and pave the way for a more strategic
management.
DEBT MANAGEMENT  AS A STRATEGIC COMPONENT  OF PUBLIC  POLICY
A different  group of OECD countries-including  New Zealand,  France,  the Netherlands
and  Australia-framed  debt  management  in  terms  of  containing  fiscal  risks  and
pioneered  the  strand of thinking  which  places  portfolio  management  within  a broader
context of public policy.  This  strand of thinking gives  a more explicit emphasis to public
policy objectives  in public debt management  including the  development of the domestic
debt  market.  It  has  often  tended-though  not  always-to  be  reflected  in  a  different
institutional model than the SDMO. New Zealand,  France, the Netherlands and Australia
have kept the DMO within the Ministry of Finance or Treasury. 17
In  the  late  1990s  and early  2000s,  debt  management  strategy  started  to  be  effectively
formulated in a nunber of countries within an Assets and Liabilities Management  (ALM)
framework.18 Under  such  a  framework,  budgetary risks  are  identified  as  the  primary
risks facing government.  Rather than analyzing the liability portfolio in isolation, several
governments found it useful to consider debt management  within the broader framework
of the government's  balance  sheet.  This implies that the nature of government revenues
and cash  flows needs  to be examined.  Identifying  and managing market risks (currency
and  interest  rate  risks)  therefore  involves  analyzing  the  financial  characteristics  of the
revenues  and  other cash  flows available  to  the govermment  to  service  its debt  and  then
choosing  a debt portfolio  which,  as  much  as possible  matches,  these  characteristics.  In
most  countries,  government  revenues  are  mainly  tax  revenues  denominated  in  local
currency.  In this case,  the  government's balance  sheet risk would be reduced by mainly
issuing debt in long-term, fixed-rate, domestic currency securities.'9
'7  The  correlation  between  ALM/fiscal  risk  approach  and  DMO  institutional  model  should  not  be
exaggerated.  For examnple,  the  UK also puts  a very strong emphasis  on the public policy  elements and yet
has given its agency significant  operational autonomy  from the UK Treasury.
18  See Jensen and Wheeler (forthconing)  and World Bankf/IM4F (2001).
19  The  DMOs  of Denmnark,  France,  Sweden  and the  United  Kingdom are  working on  strategies  which
analyze  debt  structures'  relationship  with government  revenues,  thus placing  debt management  within  a
broader financial analysis of the government balance sheet.  Sweden  is an interesting  case of a SDMO with
some  active trading,  but  which is stmultaneously  working  on models  of debt structures  and  of how  debt
costs co-vary with government revenues, within an explicit ALM framework.  A first step towards such an
22The ALM  approach  has been extended  to include  explicit contingent  liabilities,  such as
guarantees  on  debt  contracted  by sub-national  governments  or state-owned  entities,  as
well as on-lending  to these entities through  the central  government.20  Poor management
of contingent liabilities has led to significant losses for governments,  and many now seek
to manage them in a more prudent and systematic fashion.  Some governments have given
the  DMOs  an  important  role  in  managing  contingent  liability  risks,  often  in  close
coordination  with  the  Budget  Office.  The  latter  can  promote  budget  transparency  and
discipline,  while the DMO can contribute with risk quantification  and management,  and
together they can contribute  to the government's  design of a general contingent liability
policy.  For example,  in  Sweden,  New Zealand,  Canada and  Colombia,  DMOs  monitor
and manage  risks from  explicit  contingent  liabilities.  In some  countries,  debt managers
have  been made responsible  for the  oversight of potential  exposures  due to  off-balance
sheet  claims  on the  central  government.2  In  Sweden,  for instance,  the political  issues
arising out of financial  guarantees to promote projects in the public interest are referred to
Parliament,  which  makes  decisions  on guarantees  on a case-by-case  basis.  The central
government  evaluates  whether  it should  itself borrow  and on-lend,  or whether  it  should
issue a guarantee on the beneficiary's  debt. The Swedish National Debt Office (SNDO) is
in charge of managing state  guarantees  and has taken  over the responsibility for several
thousand guarantees which had been given by country administrative boards.
New Zealand was the first country to create a modem debt management  office  along the
lines  discussed  above. The  debt  management  office  was  located  within the Ministry of
Finance, albeit with elements of private sector ethos and an identity of its own within the
Ministry.  The  reform of debt management  led to a gradual  consolidation  of the DMO's
analysis is  to relate  all  costs to GDP,  which is being used as a measure of government revenues.  The UK
DMO manages  risk in the debt portfolio by determining the resilience of cost and tax smoothing properties
for different  debt  structures  to  a range  of economic  conditions  and shocks.  The optiral  debt portfolio,
made  up of different  types of securities  and  maturities,  depends  primarily on which type  of risk the fiscal
authorities  are  trying  to  contain,  and  their  preferences  over  any  cost  implications  of a  risk-reducing
strategy.  The focus could either be upon volatility of the debt servicing alone, or to government spending  as
a whole.  The Treasury will  shortly be producing  work that will look at the linkages between  fiscal policy
and the debt portfolio.
20 Implicit contingent liabilities, such as systemic risks arising from vulnerabilities  of the financial sector or
from the pension system, are not the responsibility  of the DMOs.
21  It is  convenient  to have  the DMO  manage explicit contingent  liabilities  (guarantees)  for at least two
reasons. First, lenders  have the same  credit risk exposure  on a loan to a sovereign than  on a loan to another
beneficiary  that has  a sovereign  guarantee,  and  therefore  the pricing of the two  loans  should  be the  same.
The  DMO  should  monitor  and  manage  this  pricing,  as  it  can  affect  the  pricing  of  its  own  foreign
borrowmg.  Second,  the  DMO  should  also  coordinate  access  to  international  markets  by  both  central
government  and guarantee  beneficiaries  and  ensure  an orderly  coordination  that  will  not increase  costs.
Moreover,  the central government  may wish to control the market access  of some weaker beneficiaries,  in
order  nol to send wrong signals  of the sovereign's own credit status  (Magnusson  1999b).
22 Magnusson (1999b).
23authority, with a clear separation  from monetary policy, clearly defined objectives,  sound
organizational  structures  allowing  internal  control,  better  management  information
systems and more technical  staff.  The NZDMO was  established in  1988  to improve the
management  of risks  associated  with  the  government's  debt  portfolio,  and  to provide
debt-servicing forecasts  to the budget  as well  as a range of capital markets advice to other
sections  of the  Treasury.  The  government  argued  that  locating  the  office  within  the
Treasury  allowed  close  monitoring  of  NZDMO's  effectiveness  in  managing  the
government's  portfolios.  Debt management  was implemented  within the  framework  of
the government's balance sheet, with strong public policy considerations.  More recently,
a  heightened  emphasis  on  the  government's  aggregate  balance  sheet  led  to  a  closer
integration  of the NZDMO into the Treasury's branch structure.  Since  1997, NZDMO  is
part of the Asset  and Liability Management  Branch.23 Staffing within the Treasury  was
less  of  an  issue  in  New  Zealand  because  the  civil  service  pay  structure  had  been
restructured  and improved  as part of an overall public sector reform  program,  but further
flexibility  was  given  to  the  NZDMO  to provide  higher  salaries  based  on performance
(See Box 6).
The  NZDMO  grappled  with  the  issue  of incorporating  private  sector  practices  into  its
financial  management  operations,  while  simultaneously  giving priority  to public  policy
considerations.  For exarnple,  its first consideration  was that the reduction  of net foreign
liability  positions  and  the  development  of the  domestic  debt  markets  were  more  vital
policy issues, than to manage  the risks of the foreign currency  liability portfolio  through
currency  diversification  strategies.  However,  NZDMO  also  introduced  some  active
trading  (although  only in foreign currency debt)  to maintain  contact with the market and
to keep information flowing.
Likewise,  the  Australian  Office  of Financial  Management  (AOFM)  was  established
towards the end of the  1  990s as an agency within the Treasury, adopting a comprehensive
financial  risk management  approach,  but with  a clear awareness  of public policy  issues
and the  Government's  risk  preferences.  The  fact  it  was  created  as  an  agency  gave  it
greater resources,  and thus  the capacity to recruit  and  retain highly specialized  staff (see
Box 7).
23  Activities  of the  Branch  that  are  outside  of  the  responsibility  of NZDMO  mclude  managing  the
goverrnent's contingent  liabilities  and advising on the financial  management of departmnents,  state-owned
enterprises and other institutions m which the government  has an ownership  or balance-sheet  interest.
24BOX  6.  The New  Zealand Debt Management Office
The New  Zealand  Debt Management  Office  (NZDMO)  was  created as a branch  of the
Department of Treasury responsible for managing  the government's  debt,  overall net cash flows,
and some of its interest-bearing  assets within a risk management  framework.  The Secretary to the
Treasury  is  directly  responsible  to the  Minister of Finance  for the  actions of the  NZDMO.  An
Advisory  Board provides  the  Secretary  to the  Treasury with quality assurance  of the NZDMO's
activities, risk management  framework and business plan.
Even though  it has no corporate  existence  independent  of the Treasury,  NZDMO  has a
separate  culture and identity, based  on a corporate  treasury approach, with senior officers skilled
in debt management  being  retained with  relatively  competitive  salaries.  However,  as part of the
Treasury it has clear links with the rest of public policy and its perspective  is one of managing the
debt portfolio  as part of the government's balance sheet. Moreover,  it coordinates with other parts
of the Treasury  that  advise  the Minister of Finance  on  the content  of the  government's  annual
budget  and prepares  budget  documents  and  on the  govemment's  financial  statements.  There  is
also  a  close  working  relationship  with  the  Reserve  Bank,  which  is  formalized  in  agency
agreements.
The  objective  is  to  maximize  the  long-term  economic  return  on  the  government's
financial  assets  and  debt  in  the  context  of the  government's  fiscal  strategy,  particularly  its
aversion  to risk. This requires that the  likely risks incurred  in minimizing cost be balanced.  The
risk aversion  of NZDMO  is based  on the  average  tax-payers'  risk-aversion,  their  incapacity  to
avoid  costs  imposed  by  losses  incurred  in  the  government's  portfolio  and  the  fact  that  the
government  does not have competitive  advantage  over other market participants  in attempting to
denve excess returns from its portfolio management.
NZDMO  has  analyzed  and  managed  the government's  debt  within the  structure  of the
government's  assets and liabilities,  namely,  its balance  sheet. The guiding principle  is to reduce
financial risk for the government by matching the financial characteristics  of its liabilities  to those
of its assets.
The Minister of Finance approves the strategic parameters of the portfolio, and the annual
borrowing  program,  on the recommendation  of the NZDMO,  and the latter is  also permitted to
cany  out  tactical  trading  in  its  foreign  currency  operations  around  the  benchmark,  subject  to
performance  evaluations.
Source:  Anderson and Horman (2002)
25BOX 7.  The AustraRian  Office of Financiaial Mamagememt
The  Australian  Office  of Financial  Management  (AOFM)  was  established  on  1 July  1999  as an  agency
within the  Treasury,  responsible  for Australia's  debt  management  activities.  The  latter were  previously
undertaken by a Debt Management Office within the Department of the Treasury.  The basic organizational
structure,  staffing numbers and skills,  financial resources and accountability arrangements  had not changed
m 20 years.  This led Australia to undertake  a major review of existing debt management arrangements  in
other countries.
Australia  chose  to adopt a comprehensive  financial  risk management  approach for debt management. The
fact that AOFM  was created  as an  agency within the Treasury generated  significant  additional resources,
since  the  agency  had  its  own  appropriations,  financial  accounts  and  annual  report,  and  the  capacity  to
recruit and retain specialist  skills.  A  doubling  of the  staff was  envisaged,  with  significant  investment  in
debt management systems and information technology.
However,  a direct reporting  Ime to the Treasurer via the Secretary  to the Treasurer was maintained,  and an
Advisory Board established  with both Treasury and pnvate sector representation.  This meant that although
the  new  setup  provided  both  additional  resources  and  significant  day-to-day  independence,  there  was
simultaneously  a  clear  institutional  awareness  of  public  policy  issues  and  the  Govermnent's  risk
preferences,  and awareness  as to the public policy constraint  threshold  in a  wide range  of transacting  and
relationship management situations.
Source:  Peter McCray (1999)
Moreover,  some  governments  were  of the  opinion  that  for  reasons  of  democratic
accountability  and governance,  and because  of the interconnections  between public debt
management  and  other  public  policy  areas,  taking  the  DMO  out  of the  Ministry  was
pointless. In this line of argument, the Agence France Tresor also questioned whether the
State  should  be  considered  a  financial  intermediary  and be  instructed  to  take  market
positions.  Instead,  it has made  the case that the DMO should build  and manage  a basic
desired position, and that priority should be given to the links between debt management
and the rest of public policy (see Box 8).
Recently,  the NTMA of Ireland,  that had gone down the route of a SDMO and had been
given the  mandate  to pursue  active  trading  to beat  the benchmark  (with performance-
based salaries  as incentives)  has recognized  that part of the  price that was extracted  by
the  Department  of Finance  for  setting  up  an  SDMO  was  an  excessive  emphasis  on
performance  measurement rather than on the more fundanental issue of defining a public
debt  strategy.  They have  instead recommended  that greater  emphasis  be placed  on the
strategic dimensions of debt management.  Thus,  the role of the benchmark  should be to
serve as a tool for debt management strategy design and implementation,  instead of a tool
for measuring  extra value added,  as all the  emphasis  in the  organization would be given
to the latter. This was the case of the first nine years of the NTMA (Sullivan, 1999).
Finally,  in countries  which also  experienced  high debt levels,  such as the United  States,
there has been no portfolio management  element in their debt management,  and the focus
has  been  placed  on market  development,  transparency  and  efficiency  to  achieve  long
term cost minimization  objectives.
26BOX  8.  The Agence  France Tresor
In France, the  debate  on whether  to create  a separate  debt management  agency  was  opened  and closed
several times during the  1  990s.  Fmally,  in July of 2000,  the decision  was taken to create Agence France
Tresor (AFT),  an agency located within the Treasury Department responsible for debt management,  cash
management  and back-office operations.
Various  factors weighed in the final decision  including  issues of democratic  accountability,  of corporate
governance  and  of the  degree  of integration between  debt  management  and  other  public policies.  The
State's potential  role  as  financial  intermediary  taking  market positions  was  discarded.  The  final choice
was one of institutional capacity building within the Ministry of Finance (the Treasury).
Controls  of various  types  were  instituted,  including  controls  internal  to  AFT,  controls  by  the Budget
administration  and by external auditors.  All reports are transmitted to the Treasury  Select  Committees of
the Senate and the National Assembly.
The  AFT's  objectives  include  smoothing  the  government's  debt maturity profile,  fostering  liquidity  on
secondary markets,  lowering the cost of debt service  over the medium term and dealing  with nsk.  Since
all French government debt has been transformed mto Euro, AFT no longer has to deal with currency risk,
and is  now working on a model to determine a tolerable level of interest rate risk.  Risk is viewed in terms
of cash flow volatility and its impact on the budget. AFT has developed its own risk quantification  model,
defined in terms of a full asset and liability management  model, with a holding period of 10-15  years, and
linking  GDP,  inflation,  the  government's  primary  surplus  and  interest  rates.  with  debt.  The  model
generates  an annual funding  strategy  which,  in turn, results  in a specific duration.  It is  expected that a
foirnal  unit will be established for monitoring risk versus  the benchmark, based on the  cash flow model.
However,  there are no intentions to do active trading:  AFT believes that it should not take market views,
that they  are  not traders  and  are not  able  to have  a "beat a benchmark"  strategy.  Instead,  they  aim at
achieving an average yield, using frequent issuance to "average  in".  ,
Sources:  Sylvain Forges,  Presentation at an OECD Workshop,  Rome 2001,  and Elizabeth  Currie "Update
on European DMO"  2000, mimeographed
In  sum,  public  debt  management  has  changed  very  significantly  over  the  past  fifteen
years in a number of OECD countries.  From representing merely operational dimensions
of fiscal  and monetary  policy,  it has  become  an  activity having  its  own  objectives  of
portfolio  management  in terms  of cost  and  risk,  coordinating  with  other  key  areas  of
public  policy.  Institutional  arrangements  have  differed,  as  governments  addressed  the
issues  of strengthening  institutional  capacity  in  different  ways,  and  giving  different
emphasis  to private  sector  portfolio  management  skills  and  integration with  the  rest of
public  policy.  Like  many  institutional  questions,  what  constitutes  an  appropriate
arrangement  depends very much on the particular  circumstances  in the country,  e.g.,  the
depth of the domestic  financial  market,  whether monetary policy and  debt management
policy are  separated or not  (e.g.,  whether the  debt managers  are funding  in the primary
market  and the  central bank managing  monetary  policy through  the secondary  market),
the systems and human resource  capacity within the debt office  and the central bank, etc.
Each institutional choice of location  and organization has advantages  and disadvantages.
The  commonality  between  all  these  OECD  countries  is  that  when  they  started
implementing  a  major  overhaul  of  their  debt  management  policy,  procedures  and
organizational  arrangements, it gave rise to "modern" debt management.
272.  GOVERNANCE OF DEBT MANAGEMENT OFFICES
This section discusses  the problem  which results  from the delegation of authority  to the
DMO by the  Ministry of Finance  and  describes  governance  structures  and control  and
monitoring  mechanisms  used  by different  OECD  countries  to  deal  with this  principal-
agent  problem.24 The  latter  exists whether  the  DMO  is  located  within  or outside  the
Ministry.  However,  the  agency  risk  is  greater-and  the  more  formally  the  agency
agreement  and  control  mechanisms  must be  specified-the  greater  the  autonomy  and
separation of a DMO from the Ministry. After  discussing governance issues, this section
discusses  whether  DMOs  located  inside the Ministry of Finance or  SDMOs  are  better
choices  for  countries  where  debt management  policy cannot  reasonably  be carried  out
independently of monetary policy,  and where  debt management  and fiscal policy inter-
linkages are critical to the stability of the overall economy.
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM AND THE GOVERNANCE  OF DMOs
The  Minister  of Finance  is  ultimately  responsible  for  government  borrowing  and  for
approving a debt management  strategy,  but typically the  responsibility of the day to day
operation of debt management  is delegated  to  a DMO.25 Delegation  of authority  gives
rise to  the  principal-agent  problem:  in the  presence  of asymmetric  information,  moral
hazard  may result  since  the  principal  cannot  verify  the  actions  of the  agent.  In  other
words, the principal cannot distinguish whether the pre-defined mandate  is not achieved
due to lack of effort/skill of the agent, or due to conditions outside of the agent's control.
Hence, for example, if the DMO is mandated to beat the performance benchmark and was
unable  to meet  those  targets,  it is  unclear  whether  this  was  not  achieved  due  to  poor
24 Governance  structures are characterized by agency  relationships.  The general  idea is  that the interests of
the parties  to a transaction  are at  least partially  in conflict,  and the  agent  has some  action  or information
advantage  over  the principal.  The  standard model of operation  of an agency  is  one  where  the principal
devises  a scheme of incentives or penalties,  such that the  agent's action is altered  at  least partially  in the
direction that favors the principal's interest.  This typically requires  a trade-off between efficiency  and risk-
sharing, and the result is a second-best (Dixit  1996).
25  The legal  authority to borrow  is typically granted  to the  Minister of Finance  who borrows  on behalf of
the government.  This authority is granted to the Minister by the parliament.  This is usually defined by the
legislation.  In addition,  in many countries, an  annual  funding remit or appropriation  bill approved  by the
parliament specifies the funding mandate for the year. On the legal framework for public debt management,
see Magnusson  (1999a)  and  Jensen and Wheeler (forthconung).
29effort/skills  of the  DMO  officials,  or  was  due  to  poor  market  conditions  outside  the
control of the DMO.26
Although  the  principal-agent  problem  exists  regardless  of whether  DMOs  are  located
inside or  outside  the  Ministry  of Finance,  the  requirements  for effective  delegation  of
authority are  more stringent for SDMOs because  agency risks are greater the farther way
the debt office is from the Minister of Finance.  More formal agency arrangements need to
be  established,  and  stronger  accountability  and  transparency  frameworks  are  required,
for SDMOs.
Whatever the location, in order to establish effective agency arrangements,  five important
considerations  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  design  the  appropriate
governance structure.  These include
(1)  the  DMOs  needs  to  be  identified  as  a  consolidated  entity,  either  as part  of a
department within the Ministry of Finance or outside, with clear responsibilities;
(2)  the objectives  of the DMO need  to be clearly specified,  further defined  through
strategic targets and, if active trading takes place, performance benchmarks;
(3)  the agent  needs  to be  offered  an incentive-compatible  contract  so that  desirable
levels of effort/skill  are applied or revealed;
(4)  the actions of the agent need to be monitored and risk control functions need to be
in place and
(5)  the principal must have the capacity to carry out its monitoring functions.
When institutional  safeguards  take  into account  these considerations,  then the principal-
agent  problem  between  the  Minister  of Finance  and  the  DMO  can  be  resolved.  This
partly helps explain  the existence of the multiplicity of organizational  arrangements  and
why the SDMOs can be as good as  DMOs located in the Ministry of Finance  in OECD
countries.  We now discuss these considerations  in turn.
26  This example  implies that there is an element of hidden action as well  as hidden information.  Actions
are hidden because  the principal  does not know  whether  enough effort  has been made to outperform  the
benchmark.  Hidden information can  also exist because it is debatable whether portfolio managers can have
the skill set to beat the market.  For a debate on whether or not active portfolio management adds value, see
for examnple,  Riley  (2000).  While it is at best unclear whether  debt managers'  ability/skills  can be used to
outperform  the  market,  the  evaluator  must distinguish  whether  good performance  is attributable  to those
ability/skill or to mere (consecutive)  realization  of good  'states of nature'.  Two additional  source of moral
hazard  can be  identified.  First,  the DMO can issue  state  contingent debt which the government  can then
affect  its  outcome,  such  as  government  expenditure  contingent  debt.  Thus,  Bohn (1990)  suggested  that
government  activity  on  markets  designed  to  provide  hedges  against  budgetary  uncertainty  may  be
particularly problematic,  because  of incentive  and asymmetric  information problems.  However,  as long as
conventional  debt  is used,  this problem  does  not arise.  Also, the  moral  hazard  is not in  relation to  the
principal-agent  problem discussed here.  Second, if the DMO is allowed to trade in the domestic market, it
can  influence  the  direction  of the  market  due  to  its  sheer  size,  and  thereby  influence  the  benchmark
portfolio  as well.
30Status of the Debt Management  Office
First,  where  debt  management  functions  are  scattered  across  different  institutions  and
departments,  it is difficult for the Minister to delegate his authority in a coherent manner.
Hence  it is important that debt management functions be consolidated  into a single office
and  established  with a formal status/identity with a clearly designated Head of the DMO
so that the responsibility can be delegated.  The degree of formality  in establishing  debt
offices  as  agencies  reporting  to  the  Minister  of Finance  depend  on whether  they  are
SDMOs or DMOs located within the Ministry of Finance.  Some SDMOs are established
by statutes which defines their legal status, responsibility, reporting line and organization.
Others  may be created  by  Ministerial  decision  without  a  special  legal  status,  and  their
responsibilities,  reporting  line  and  organization  are  outlined  in  a separate  document.  A
good example is provided by the UK Executive Framework Document (Box 9).
BOX 9.  The United Kingdom's Executive  Agency  Framework Document
The separate  responsibilities of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Treasury Ministers, the
Permanent Secretary  to the Treasury, and the DMO's Chief Executive are set out in an Executive
Agency  Framework  Document.  This  document  also  sets  out  the  strategic  objectives  of the
agency  and the  lines of accountability  to Parliament  of its Chief Executive  concerning  agency
performance and operations. Accountability  applies both in respect to administrative  expenditure
and to the Debt Management Account which records all its issuance and trading transactions.
The Framework Document outlines the following:
- status, aim and objectives;
- accountability and relationships with the Treasury;
- accountability to Parliament;
- role of Permanent Secretary to the Treasury as the principal accounting officer;
- role of the  Chief Executive  responsible  for day to day  management  of the DMO.  The  CE is
responsible  to the Chancellor  and accountable  to Parliament for the DMO's performance  and
operations;
- internal  management of the Office. The Chief Executive is assisted by the Managing Committee
that will consider all strategic  and management issues;
- responsibility  for the preparation  of an  annual Business Plan,  as well as a corporate  plan that
will develop a strategic framework over the following three years;
- responsibility  for the preparation of the Annual Report and Accounts;
- financial arrangements  of the DMO;
- internal and external auditing of the DMO;
-responsibility for setting the DMO's human resource policies and for managing staff; and
-review arrangements for the framework document and publication.
Source:  United Kingdom (1998)
DMOs located within the Ministry of Finance may be created by Ministerial  decision and
do not have  a separate legal  status,  although they too benefit  from  a clear identity with
published documents  specifying responsibilities,  accountabilities  and reporting  line.  The
Head of DMO  is responsible  for the day to day  operation  of the DMO.  The Head  is
directly  answerable  to  the  Minister  of Finance  who  is,  in  turn,  answerable  to  the
Parliarnent.
31DDebt Management Objectives
It is  essential  that  the debt management  objectives  be clearly specified  and that, where
possible,  these  be  translated  into  medium  term  strategic  targets  which  reflect  the
government's risk preferences,  including policy guidelines for risk-management.  The risk
preference  of the  government  reflects  the  mandate  given  by  the  Parliament  to  the
Minister which should reflect the median voter's taste for risk. Table  1 provides examples
of debt management objectives in selected countries.
Table 1. lDebt Management Objectives  in Selected Countries
Country  Debt Management Objectives
Austraha  The principal objective of the AOFM is for Commonwealth debt to be raised, managed
and retired at the lowest possible long-term cost, consistent with an acceptable degree of
risk exposure.
Denmark  The overall objective  of the government debt policy is to achieve the lowest possible
long-terrn borrowing costs. The objective is supplemented by odher considerations:
-To keep the risk at an acceptable level
-Overall to build up and support a well-functioning,  effective financial market in
Denmark
-To ease the central govermnent's  access to the financial markets in the longer term.
Ireland  The debt management objective  for the NTMA  is to fund raturing debt and the annual
borrowing  requirement of the  govermment  in such  a way as  to protect  both short term
and  long  term  liquidity,  contain  the  level  and  volatility  of annual  fiscal  debt  service
costs, contain the government's  exposure to risk and outperform  a benchmark or shadow
portfolio.
New Zealand  To  maxirnise  the  long-term  economic  return  on  the  Government's  financial
assets and  debt in the  context of the Government's  fiscal strategy,  particularly
its aversion to risk.
Portugal  The IGCP rnission is to raise funds and to execute  other financial transactions, on behalf
of the Republic of Portugal, in such a way as:
- To fulfill the borrowing requirements  of the Republic  in a stable manner;
- To minimise the cost of  the government  debt on a long-term perspective subject to the
risk strategies defined by the Govermment.
While providing  a service of public interest, the IGCP develops  its activities based on
Principles of efficiency and transparency.
Sweden  The  objective  in managing the  central  govermnent  debt is to minimize,  on a long-term
basis, the costs of  the debt with due regard to the risks associated  with debt management.
However,  the  management  must  always  be  conducted  within  the  framework  of the
requirements  imposed by monetary policy, and the guidelines determined by the Council
of Ministers.
U.K.  To meet the  annual remit  set by Treasury  Ministers  for the sale  and purchase of gilts,
with high regard to long- term cost minimisation taking account of  risk.  In doing so, the
Office will take account of wider policy considerations  which may constrain strict cost
minimisation (for example, providing for retail holdings of gilts).
32Strategic Targets
Having  defined  a  clear  set  of  objectives,  these  need  to  be  translated  into  an
implementable  debt  management  strategy  expressed  in  terms  of  strategic  targets.27
Following  analytical work in the DMO, a range of possible targets can be proposed to the
Minister  who would then approve a strategy which is consistent with the sovereign's risk
preference.28 The approved  target then becomes the strategic target.  With this approval,
the DMO becomes  responsible  for implementing the debt management  strategy with the
aim  of  reaching  the  strategic  targets.  Publication  of the  debt  management  strategy
reinforces  transparency  and  accountability  of the  DMO.  This  become  important  if the
DMO is far removed from the control of the Minister since this constitutes a key part of
the formal agency arrangement.  Table 2 illustrates strategic targets  for selected countries
where these are published.
For  example,  in  Sweden,  in  order  to  increase  accountability,  the  Parliament  was
requested  to set clear goals  for the debt management  and a guideline-based  steering was
introduced  which specifies  the  strategic targets.  This is published on the SNDO website.
It  increases transparency  and predictability,  allowing the DMO to  focus on its task,  and
results in a political commitment  to a clear strategy for public debt management.
27  We use the term strategic targets  to distmguish from benchmarks  used for performance  measurement
purposes.  Strategic  targets  are  derived  from  nsk cost  trade-off  analysis  based  on  long term cash  flow
simulation  exercises  and are long run goals.  Performance  benchmarks are  marked-to  market values  of the
shadow  portfolio  that  would  have  resulted  if the  DMO  executed  the  transactions  following  the  pre-
determmed  targets.  Strategic  targets  and performance benchmarks  can be identical if the current portfolio
can be  transformed  instantaneously  through  the  use of swaps  and buybacks.  If this  is not  possible, the
strategic target and the performance  benchmark will look very different.
28  See  Jensen  and  Wheeler  (forthcoming)  for  a  descnption  of the  analytical  work  that  needs  to  be
peribrmed in order to derive  the strategic benchmark.
33Table 2. Published Strategic Targets for Selected Countries
Strate  ic Targets and Debt Managemen  Polhcy
Country  Gross  Currency  Currency  Interest rate  Refinancing
Debt to  composition  sub- (As of date)  GDP29 Domestic:Foreign  portfolio  Fix:Float  Modified Duration  Max ceiling on debt maturing in
(years) 30 next year (% total outstanding)
Australia  D  3.25 ± 025
(6/01)  10%  90:10 to 85:15  F  ____  12±2 v6/01  F  1.25 ± 025
Belgium  107.6%  97:3 to 100:03'  D  4 ±0.30  redemption profile
(12/0 1)  ___  _redemption___  __  __  ___  _profile___  __
Colombia  61  73  03  .015%  in 12 months,  30% in 36
(12/01)  61%  67:33  70:30  3.50  months
Denmark  38  8:2  1  &  . Smoothen redemiption profile of-
(12/01)  38%  88:12  D&F  3.5±0.5  total debt
France  10% in
(12/01)  57.3%  100:0  D  mflation  Average maturity of 5.5 years
indexed
Ireland  3%94:6  D  - 3.7
(12/01)  38%
Italy  D  75:25  3.5  Increase average life and
(12/01)  smoothen redemption profile
New Zealand  100:033  D  80:20-  Maintam an even maturity
(12/01)  ~~~~~~~~70:30  profile
Portugal  56%  100:0  D  68:32  3.0  25% in 12 months, 35% in 24
(12/01)  months,  45% in 36 months
Sweden  D  2.9 ± 0.3  25% in 12 months and to have a
(1 1/01)34  52%  73:27  F  2.3 ± 0.3  disperse maturity profile
United Kinf.dorn  1%10:  Issue debt across a variety of (t12/0K1)mgd  31%  100:0  instruments
Umted States  Issue securities across a wide (8/2)3  _  42%  100:0  D  rag-o  -auite
29  Outstanding of central government debt.  (UK and US are net debt).
30  Modified duration = Percentage  change  in market value arising  from a  one percentage  point change  in
nominal  interest  rates.  Denmark and  Sweden use  the Macaulay  duration  which is  defined as:  weighted
average of the length of period to each payment,  where  the  weights  are the relative  size of the individual
3ayments.
I  The government's policy is to repay in full as soon as possible its foreign currency debt.
32  The norm for domestic borrowmg states that the issuance of domestic krone-denominated  government
securities  within a year shall match the gross central  government borrowing requirement  less redemptions
on the foreign  debt.  The norm for foreign borrowing  states that the central  government's redemptions  on
the foreign debt are refinanced by foreign borrowing.
33  Foreign  debt  is  incurred  only to  finance  intemational  reserves  hence  NZ and the  UK has  zero  net
foreign currency  debt.
34  The  benchmark  only covers  nominal  debt;  inflation  indexed  debt  is not  covered.  Benchmark  to  be
achieved  by  2004.  Long term  goal  is to  reduce  the proportion  of foreign  currency debt  and increase  the
share of domestic currency  uiflation indexed  debt.
35  The UKDMO does not publish its strategic targets.
36  The US  Treasury does not have  a  strategic  target  as they predominantly  issue  fixed  rate debt  and the
priority is to enhance efficiency  and transparency  of the market.
34Sources  for Table 2:
- Australia (2001) Australian Office of Financial Management Annual Report 2000-01.
http://www.aofm.gov.au/
- Belgium (2002) Admnuistration of  the Treasury Ministry of  Finance, Kingdom of Belgium Annual
report 2001.  http://treasurv.fgov.be/
- Colombia (2002) Presentation to the Seminario  Sobre Manejo  de Riesgo de Deuda Puiblica
Colombiana, April 34, 'Gestion de Riesgo DGCP - Parte II'.
http:/Hwww.minhacienda.gov.co/
- Denmark (2002) Danmarks Nationalbank, Danish Government Borrowing and Debt 2001.
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/
- France (2002) Agency France Tresor 2001/2002 Annual Report http://www.francetresor.gouv.fr/
- Ireland  (2002) National Treasury Management Agency Ireland Report and financial statements for the
year ended 31  December 2001 http://www.ntma.ie/
- Italy (2001) Public Debt Department, Dipartimento  del Tesoro ,'Guidelines  for public debt
management for 2002-2003'. http://www.tesoro.itl
- New  Zealand.  http://www.nzdmo.govt.nz
- Portugal (2002) Instituto  de Gestao do Credito Piblico Government Debt Management Annual Report
2001. http://www.igcp.pt
- Sweden  (2001) Swedish National Debt Office,  Guidelines  for Central Government Debt Management
in 2002. http://www.rgk.se/
- IJnited Kingdom (2002):  http://www.dmo.gov.uk/dmodomain.htm
- United  States (2002):  htto://www.publicdebt.treas.nov/
Some countries, notably Australia  and the UK, have broader public policy objectives  for
public  debt  management  which  are more difficult  to express  as  a measurable  target.  In
turn,  these  countries  have  devised  ways  to  overcome  this  difficulty  of encompassing
broader  public  policy  objectives  into measurable  targets by separating  measurable  and
observable  outcomes  (e.g.,  to provide  high quality and efficient  service  to investors, to
make information  available  to the public, to develop policy and promote advances in new
instruments,  issuance  techniques  and  structural  changes  to  the  debt and  Treasury bill
marlcets  that may  help  to  enhance  the  efficiency  and  lower  the  cost of debt  and cash
management) from non-measurable objectives related to outputs (e.g. debt management).
While  accountability  for  outcomes  (which  may be  characterized  as the  actions  of the
agent) can be exclusively given to the DMO, thereby partially  resolving the problem of
moral  hazard  arising  from  lack  of effort,37 the  responsibility  and  accountability  for the
output  (which may depend on the actions of the agent and/or the state of nature, between
which the principal is unable to distinguish) rests on the Minister himself.38
37  This  obviously  presumes  that  effort/ability  will  result  in  higher  chances  of better  outcomes,  while
leaving the possibility that states of nature can play a role in an uncertain world.
38  The  output  is  the responsibility  of the  Minister,  and therefore  he/she  is responsible  for designing  a
policy strategy  such that there  is  policy coordination  with other public  sector departments,  and taking into
account policy interactions.
35Performance  Benchmarks
Where  active  trading  takes  place,  strategic  targets  are  reinforced  through  the
establishment  of  performance  benchmarks.  The  trading  is  carried  out  vis-a-vis  a
performance  benchmark,  which  enables the principal  to measure the performance of the
debt managers,  holding them  accountable  for their actions.39 In many OECD countries,
strategic  targets  may be  synonymous  with  performance  benchmark  where  the  existing
portfolio can be transformed  into the desired portfolio in a relatively  short period of time.
Where this is not possible, the distinction  is important.
The  extreme  case  was  perhaps  that  of Ireland  since,  as  mentioned  above,  beating  the
benchmark  was built into its objectives when it was created.  Sweden  and Denmark also
engaged  in active trading.  Portugal's benchmark  initially focused  on strategic  objectives,
and  its main purpose  was  to improve  the  consistency  between  day to  day  management
and  the  long-term  portfolio  goals;  however,  for  accountability  reasons,  the  benchmark
also came  to  be used  for  evaluation  purposes  which  naturally  led to  the  expectation  of
out-performing  the  benchmark.40 Austria  has  active  trading  vis-a-vis  a  performance
benchmark.
Most  debt  managers  tend  to  abstain  from  engaging  in  active  trading  in  the  domestic
market and  beating  the  benchmark  is  carried  out  only  in  the  foreign  currency  market
where the government is a price taker,  and where it cannot influence the outcome of the
benchmark  itself.  The  Guidelines  for  Public  Debt  Management  highlight  the  risks
involved in engaging in active trading (see Box 10).
39  The need for performance  measurement  is not confined to SDMOs and would also be essential if there
was active trading by a DMO within the Ministry.
40  See World Bank / IMF (2002). Accompanying Document to Debt Management Guidelines,  chapter on
Portugal.
36BOX 10. Scope  for Active Management
Debt managers  who seek to manage actively the  debt portfolio to profit from expectations  of movements in
interest rates and exchange  rates,  which differ from those implicit m current market prices,  should be aware
of the risks mvolved and accountable  for their actions. These risks mclude possible fnancial losses, as well
as  conflicts  of interest,  and adverse  signalmg with respect  to monetary  and fiscal policies.  In order to be
able  to  lower  borrowing  costs  without  increasing  risk by  taking  market  views,  debt  managers  require
information  or judgment  that  is  supenor  to that  of other  market participants  (and  must  also be  able  to
transact In an efficient manner).
Debt managers  may  have better  mformation  on financial  flows  in the domestic  market  and the  financial
condition  of market participants  due to the  government's  pnvileged  role as  supervisor  or regulator of the
financial system. However, most governments  consider it unwise and unethical to try and capitalize  on such
inside  information,  especially  in  the  domestic  market.  In  particular,  debt  managers  and  policymakers
should  not engage  In tactical  trading  on the  basis of inside  information  with respect  to  future  fiscal  or
monetary  policy  actions.  This  is because  the  government  is usually  the  dominant  issuer of debt  in the
domestic  market,  and  it risks  being  perceived  as  manipulating  the  market,  if it buys  and  sells  its  own
securities  or uses derivatives for the purpose of trying to generate additional  mcome.  Moreover, if the debt
managers  adopt  interest rate  or  currency  positions,  their actions  could also  be  interpreted  as  signaling  a
government view on the desired  future direction of interest rates or the  exchange rate, thereby makmg the
central bank's task more difficult.
In foreign capital  narkets, debt managers  generally have  little or no information on the nature of financial
flows  beyond that  available  in the  market  generally.  Even  so,  some  governments  actively  manage  their
foreign  currency debt in the hope of generating  risk adjusted returns, or to enable their portfolio  managers
to  accumulate  greater  market  knowledge,  in  an  attempt  to  generate  cost  savings  on  major borrowings.
Many  governments  do not consider  it appropriate to undertake  such tactical trading.  In cases where  such
trading  is  permitted,  it should  be  conducted  under  clearly  defined  portfolio  guidelines  with  respect  to
position and loss limnits,  compliance procedures, and performance  reporting. In countries  where govermnent
debt managers  undertake  tactical  tradmg,  it normally comprises  only a small  fraction of a govermnent's
portfolio management  activities.
Source: World Bank / IMF (2001)  Guideluies for Public Debt Management
Performance Incentives
In order  to  resolve  the  problem  arising  from  the  difficulty  to  distinguish between  the
efforts and  ability of the agent on the  one hand, and the outcome of 'the state of nature'
on the other hand,  the principal must  establish an  incentive-compatible  contract  so that
the agent will make the necessary efforts and perform well.  This is especially true when
there  is active trading  which  involves  taking market  positions  to  beat the performance
benchmark and providing rewards for good results.
In order to reward performance  and devise an incentive compatible  contract, pay systems
and  other  incentive  schemes  need  to  be  established  where  rewards  are  linked  to
performance,  as  opposed to being limited by a rigid civil service  pay structure.  Under a
rigid civil  service pay structure,  the incentive  to  take on risk in order to minimize cost
may not exist as public servants do not get rewarded for saving costs, while they may be
37penalized if they lose public money.  In contrast, incentive compatible contract links cost-
reduction objectives  to a private-sector ethos involving salary bonuses for achieving cost-
reductions  versus  the benchmark.  This pay system was  introduced  in countries  such as
Ireland.
Regardless of performance measurement,  however,  debt managers provide  high value to
the  economy  and  a  competitive  salary  should be  secured  in order  to  attract  and retain
skilled staff.  In New  Zealand,  an overall public  sector  reform was  underway when the
NZDMO  was  created  and  a  separate  pay  scale  system  was  established  within  the
Treasury that is different from the rest of the civil service.
Monitoring and Control
The actions  of the  agents  must  be  monitored  and  controlled.  The  farther  removed  the
DMO is from the principal, the more formally this must be carried out in order to reduce
agency  risk.  Monitoring  and  control  functions  may  be  carried  out  by  setting  up- an
independent  risk control department  with "fire  walls"  to prohibit  front office personnel
from  manipulating  back  office  information,  and internal  auditing  department  reporting
directly  to  the  Board  or  CEO.  This  function  can  be  very  expensive  due  to  system
requirement  and  human  resource  allocation,  but  is  extremely  important  if trading  is
carried out in light of the operational  risks that can potentially bring down the country's
finances  to ruins.4'
Several  governments have established Boards of Directors for the SDMOs. The Board of
Directors  generally  has  a  fiduciary  responsibility  to  monitor,  ratify  and  sanction  the
decisions  of the  SDMO.  The Board of Directors proposes  debt management  guidelines,
lays  down the  principles  as  to how the  guidelines  will be implemented  and establishes
limits for the management  of the risks associated  with the DMO's activities.  The Board
meets  periodically  to  analyze  the  general  orientation  of  the  DMO  and  evaluate  the
Office's performance vis-a-vis the guidelines and the principal risk/cost objective.
In Portugal, the Board of Directors  is much more involved  and is responsible  for all the
organizational  and  operational  matters  of  the  DMO,  such  as  defining  its  intemal
management  policy, the structure  and functions of its departments,  managing the human
resources  and assets of the DMO,  etc.  Its Advisory Board, by contrast, gives  its opinion
on the annual financing plan and similar technical matters.  Members of both  Boards are
chosen  by  the  govenmment  and  can  be  government  officials  or  members  of private
institutions. 42
In  order  to  ensure  transparency  in  accounting  for  financial  transactions  and  internal
management,  sometimes an Audit Committee or the full Board  guides the intemal Audit
41  The collapse of Barings bank and financial ruins of Orange County illustrate the potential
damage poor operational risk management can cause.
42  Annex Table A. I shows  the roles played by Boards of Directors and Committees  in selected
countries.
38Department  in overseeing  and controlling the accounts  and books of the  SDMO.  This is
the case in countries such as Australia and New Zealand.
When the DMOs is located  within the Ministry of Finance,  there is no Board of Directors
to  oversee  the  activities  of the  head  of the  DMOs  but  the  latter  may benefit  from  the
expertise of an Advisory Board to ensure technical  quality of the outputs of the DMOs.
To ensure accountability of their  staff and transparency  of their activities, both  SDMOs
and  DMOs  have  set  up  other  types  of controls  and  monitoring  mechanisms.  These
include strengthened  reporting on a regular basis to the Minister,  reporting annually to the
Parliament,  being  subjected to parliamentary  scrutiny and to internal and external audits,
and making regular reports public.  This also assists in warding off political pressures  to
focus  on  short  term  cost  reduction,  since  debt  managers  will  be  protected  by  the
publication of the  agreed  mandate  to  pursue  the  objective  of long  term  cost  reduction
subject to risks.
Can the Principal Carry Out its Monitoring Function ?
A final key consideration  in establishing  an effective agency agreement is the question of
whether  the  principal  can  carry  out  its  monitoring  function.  When  all  the  debt
management  know-how  is  located outside  the  government,  the result  is that sometimes
the  MOF  lacks  the  technical  capacity  to  evaluate  a debt management  strategy.  The
Advisory Board and Committees are formed to discuss technical and management  issues,
albeit  with  different  degrees  of authorities  empowered  to  them.  Typically,  Advisory
Boards  do  not  have  any  executive  power.  These  committees  are  staffed  by  DMO
employees  or by staff from  the government  or the private  sector.  However,  the policy-
makers  in the  Ministry  of Finance  are those who  ultimately decide  on the general  debt
management  strategy and, if they are to fulfil this role, they must, in a broad sense, have
the  same  competence  in these  matters  as  the  SDMO.  This  is even  more  important  if a
guideline based steering of the debt management  is adopted.
Officials  from some OECD countries with SDMOs acknowledge that the oversight given
to  therm  by the MOF  is relatively  weak because  the staff dedicated  to this  oversight  is
small  in  numbers  and  insufficiently  trained  in  debt  management,  having  little  contact
with the markets,  etc.
Where policy coordination is important,  the Advisory Board and the Committee perform
crucial  functions in achieving this goal.
39IMPLUCATIONS  FOR EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
The  previous  section  has  described  the  principal-agent  problem  and  discussed  key
considerations  that need to be addressed in order to make the delegation  of authority from
the  principal  to the  agent  effective.  It  described  how  both  DMOs  located  inside  the
Ministry of Finance  and SDMOs  in OECD countries have dealt with these issues.
How  transferable  is  the  experience  of advanced  OECD  countries  for emerging  market
economies?  If  their  governments  are  considering  improvements  in  public  debt
management,  what  institutional  arrangements  are  most  appropriate?  Would  it  be
sufficient  to  set up  safeguards  in order  to deal  with the  agency risks  of SDMOs  or are
there other compelling reasons  that favor DMOs  located inside the Ministry of Finance
over SDMOs?  Are there other issues that they should take into consideration  in making
this decision?
Many  emerging  market  economies  face  a similar  situations  to that of advanced  OECD
countries:  high fiscal deficits and high levels of indebtedness,  and the need to control the
risk of increases  in debt  servicing  and  its impact on the  government budget.  However,
their  government  balance sheets  are more exposed  to the possibility of financial  shocks
because  their  economies  are  less  diversified  than  advanced  OECD  countries,  have  a
smaller base of domestic financial  savings and less developed  financial  systems, and are
more  susceptible  to financial  contagion through  the relative  magnitude of capital  flows.
The governments  of many  of those  countries  do not have  the  low-risk  option of having
domestic  debt  with  long  maturities  and  fixed  interest  rates  because  they  lack  well-
developed domestic  debt markets.  Thus these governments  are often faced with a choice
between  issuing  short-terrn  or  indexed  domestic  debt,  and  issuing  long  term  foreign
currency debt.  The transition countries of Central  and Eastern Europe  can be categorized
as emerging market economies with special characteristics  (see Box  11).
40Box  11.  Debt Management  in Central and Eastern Europe
Transition  countries  differ from other  emerging market  economies  in that major reforms  in the  structure,
organization,  and methods  of financing of the  public sector  were  necessary  to create  a  govermnent sector
adapted  to a market economy.  The countnes of Central and Eastern Europe  are relatively  advanced  in this
process,  compared  with some  countnes  of the former  Soviet Union.  In terms of initial  institutional  setup
for debt management, these countries  shared similar traits:
- The role played by the Ministry of Finance was inadequate.  In particular,  its policy formulation capacity
was weak and as a result,  it often pursued unsustainable borrowing  targets.
- The coordmation between the Mimstry  of Finance  and the Central Bank was weak, resultmg m frequent
and harmful lack of harmonization between the monetary and fiscal policy.
- Middle office functions to carry out nsk analysis and risk control were limited or nonexistent.
- State-owned  foreign  trade banks were borrowing  in  foreign markets  on behalf of the government  and
state-owned  enterprises  in many countries. Most of the trained cadre were concentrated  in these banks
and  they  managed  the  government  debt  portfolio  under  poorly  structured  agency  agreement.  Risk
management  was  poor.  Non-transparent  portfolio  management  practices  and  weak  supervisory
capacity in some cases turned these foreign trade banks into a major mstitutional risk.
- Government  debt management  institutions  generally had  a very inadequate  human and physical capital
endowment,  were unable to attract and retain high-quality staff and thus unable to  manage risks arising
from volatile  markets
- Debt management systems  were fragmented,  debt records were very unreliable, and information systems
were not connected across departments.
- Institutions  for the  management  of contingent  liabilities  were absent.  The  issuance  of guarantees  was
poorly structured.  State owned enterprises and banks had little risk management practice and there was
little monitonng of contingent liabilities by the central government.
Dunng the  1990s,  the countries of Central and Eastern Europe reformed their public debt management
institutions at varying  speeds and with varying  degrees  of success.  Two groups can be distinguished.  One
"legacy"  group  which  includes  former  CMEA  countries  that  had  governmental  structures  to  manage
sovereign  debt,  i.e.,  Poland,  Hungary,  Romama  and  Bulgaria.  Another  group  consists  of "clean  slate"
countries  that did not exist as  sovereign  entities  before the  transition,  i.e. the  three Baltic  states,  Slovenia
and  Slovakia.  Countries  of the second group  had to build their  sovereign debt institutions  from scratch.  In
the  case of Czechoslovakia,  one  successor  state (the  Czech  Republic)  inherited  the  sovereign borrowing
institutions  of the  state that ceased  to exist  and belongs  in the  "legacy"  group while  the  other successor
state, Slovakia,  is a "clean slate" country.
The expenence  of mdividual countnes  has been very varied - ranging  from positive  (as in Latvia,
Poland or Hungary)  to very traumatic  (as m Bulgaria in 1995,  or Romania  in  1999).  The main strengths of
the  legacy countries is their cadre  of trained debt managers,  even though they lacked some essential  skills,
particularly  in policy  formulation.  The  main  weakness  of the  legacy countries  has  been  that their  debt
management  institutions  have  had great  difficulty to  contain the pressures  for  over-borrowing.  Bulgaria
started  with  high  levels  of external  debt  in  the  early  1990s  and  the  realization  of massive  contingent
liabilities  thereafter  from state owned enterprises  combmed  with poor fiscal  management led to a financial
meltdown in 1995-96.  In the clean slate countries,  starting  from scratch made it easier to mtroduce sound
practices.  In Estonia, low imtial debt was maintained thanks to a policy of minimal government borrowmg
and no  issuance  of guarantees.  In Latvia,  Slovakia  and Slovenia-which  started from a position of no or
little  debt-the  growth  of the  public  debt  has  been  rapid and  significant.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  poor
management  of contmgent  liabilities  and  over-generous  privatization  schemes  left  the  government  with
massive  increases  in  debt  levels.  Measured  against  the  situation  in  1990,  all  ten  countries  have
strengthened  their public  debt management  institutions,  introduced  more efficient  and modern  methods of
monitoring  debt and managing its nsks, and generally achieved more manageable debt levels, progressively
putting them in a position to meet the Maastncht  cnteria.  Whule  these countnes are not expected  to opt for
the Euro immediately  upon  their accession to  the EU,  the need  to make progress  in the  fulfillment  of the
convergence criteria  with regard to deficit and debt levels is now one of the major drivers of their economic
policies  including public debt management policies.
Source:  Sergei Shatalov, personal  communication.
41Typically,  emerging  market  economies  will be  vulnerable  to  public  debt crises.  Major
externalities  are  attached  to  the  government's  debt  portfolio  since  it  is  usually  the
country's  largest  financial  portfolio,  and  it  can  generate  risk  not  only  for  the
government's  balance  sheet but  also  for  the  country's  financial  stability  as  a whole.
Private sector  entities -in particular the  financial  sector- can  face major problems  when
inadequate public risk management  increases the vulnerability to a liquidity crisis.  Debt
portfolios  with  significant  interest  rate,  currency  and  refinancing  risks  have  been
important  in inducing  or propagating  economic  crises  in several  countries.  While risky
debt  management  is  often the  result  of inappropriate  economic  policies,  the feedback
effects go in both directions.
Perhaps  one  of the  key  factors  that  distinguishes  advanced  OECD  economies  from
emerging market economies (including transition economies)  is the degree to which debt
management policy can reasonably be implemented  independent of other policy making
bodies,  notably  the  monetary  authorities,  and the  challenges  facing  the government  in
developing the domestic debt market.  This has important implications for the governance
and  location  of DMOs  because,  in  the  context  of achieving  the  stated  objectives  and
strategic  targets, if the debt manager  is unable  to influence the  composition  of the  debt
portfolio-or if its  actions  are significantly compromised  by the actions of other policy
making bodies-then  the degree to which the  debt manager  can be held accountable  for
its own actions becomes questionable.
In advanced  OECD  economies,  since  debt management functions  have been taken  away
from the  central  banks,  DMOs  have been  given policy independence  to  carry out  debt
management.  While coordination between DMOs and the monetary authorities continues
to be important-for example to ensure that the timing of debt issuance does not coincide
with  seasonal  peaks  when  liquidity  in the  system  is tight-,  the DMO  and the  central
bank  in  OECD  economies  also  have  instrument independence  in  the  sense  that  each
operate with  different policy instruments,  in different  segments  of the  market  or in  the
primary and secondary markets, to implement their policy objectives.
In these countries,  each policy-maker  can take  fuller control of its own actions to achieve
their respective  objectives without jeopardizing each other's future policy actions.  Under
such  circumstances,  debt managers  cannot  blame the monetary authorities  or vice versa
for the outcome of its own policy actions.  Although the outcome can still be a result  of
'the state of nature', it is the case that each policy-maker  has a priori  ability to implement
its own policy.
43  In countries  such  as France  or the United States,  the  central  bank  and the Ministry  of Finance try  to
avoid conflicts  by  issuing  different  types  of instruments  (central  bank bills  and treasury  bills).  In other
cases,  the  government  debt  is  utilized  by  both  the  central  bank  and the  Ministry  of Finance  but the
institutions  operate on different maturities.  In general, monetary operations are  conducted with instruments
of shorter maturities than debt financing.  If markets  are sufficiently developed,  best practices  are oriented
towards the use of the same instruments  for both monetary and debt purposes,  but limiting  the central bank
to  conduct its  operations  only in secondary markets,  leaving issuance  in the pnmary market  solely  to the
Ministry of Fmnance.  ( The points about policy and instrurnent independence  were raised by Fred Jensen).
42For  developing  and  transition  countries  in  which  the  domestic  debt  market  is
underdeveloped,  debt management  and monetary  authorities  may have  to operate  in the
same  segments of the market,  typically  in  the  short maturity  range.  The  central bank
intervenes  in the market  to signal tightening  of monetary policy,  but this may constrain
the  debt management  authority's  ability to  roll over  its  debt  at reasonable  cost or  may
force it to issue debt in foreign markets instead.
Indeed, in countries with a history of high and volatile inflation, a large  share of the total
debt tends to be indexed  to inflation or short-term interest rate, or to foreign exchange, as
investors expect  future inflation or devaluation and demand hedges from the government.
Indexation  to monetary targets increases the sensitivity of debt servicing cost to shifts in
central bank policy variables,  and this  can jeopardize  the government's  effort to manage
the  risk-cost tradeoffs.  If the debt manager  cannot deliver its policy objective,  then an
agency agreement may be difficult to implement  since their actions will be closely inter-
related with the actions of other policy makers.
In  the  same  vein,  if the  fiscal  authorities  continue  to  build  up  primary  deficits  or  if
contingent  liabilities  are not  under  control,  the effect  of the  debt managers'  actions  are
compromised  as  fiscal  sustainability  becomes  an  issue.  Debt  management  is  not  a
substitute  for poor  fiscal policy:  where fiscal  policy is poor, debt management  outcomes
may  be poor  because  of deteriorating  macroeconomic  conditions,  not because  of poor
ability or lack of effort by the debt manager.
Because of the interdependencies  of policies, many developing  countries  find it difficult
to  implement  medium  term  strategy,  as  high  debt  levels  or  a history  of high  inflation
impede  their  progress  toward  their  target.  This  is  particularly  true  during  a  crisis
situation.  This may leave the DMOs reluctant to publish their strategic targets because of
their inability to implement them.
The interdependencies  of policy instruments-and  of the policies themselves-highlight
the  importance  of policy  coordination,  rather  than  an  emphasis  on  independence  and
autonomy  which  they cannot  attain  in the  first  place.  This  points  to  the desirability of
establishing  the  DMO  inside  the  Ministry  of Finance.  Furthermore,  if accountability
cannot  be  firmly  defined,  it  is  difficult  to  establish  a  formal  agency  agreement,  as
required in the case of a SDMO.
There  are  other  considerations  that  distinguish  emerging  and  transition  countries  from
advanced  OECD  economies.  For example,  whether  an effective  agency  agreement  can
be  established  depends  on  the  tradition  of  democratic  culture  of transparency  and
accountability.  Advanced  OECD countries,  such  as the Scandinavian  countries,  have a
tradition  of transparency  and  accountability  rooted  in  a  strong  democratic  history  that
made  the management of the public debt by an independent  agency  less risky.44  This  is
far from being  the case  in  all emerging  market countries.  Institutional  arrangements  to
44  Sweden  has  a long history  of delegation of authonty  outside Ministnes  (the latter  being  traditionally
minimally staffed).
43ensure  accountability  and  transparency  of  public  borrowing  policy  were  totally
inadequate  until  very recently.  Parliaments  and  independent  audit institutions  played  a
very limited role, and there was poor public disclosure and reporting.
It  is  also  common  that,  in  emerging  and  transition  economies,  existing  contingent
liabilities  are not accounted  for and  new ones  are not controlled or managed.  This can
present  significant  complications  to  carrying  out  public  debt  management.  In  several
transition  countries-for  example,  Poland,  Hungary  and  the  Czech  Republic-  state
enterprises (especially utilities) and banks were allowed to shift their losses to the budget.
The transition led to an increase in the central government debt and to a mushrooming of
implicit  and  explicit  liabilities  including  guarantees  (see Box  11).  For instance  in the
Czech Republic  in 1997-98,  the budget deficit was  1.3%  of GDP but the hidden  deficit
was almost three  times as large.  Loss  of control over fiscal policy meant that increasing
debt levels, high refinancing risk and low government  credibility which, in turn, implied
major constraints  for financing in the long-term  and with fixed interest rates.45 For many
transition  countries,  contingent  liabilities  such  as  guarantees  to  support  large  public
enterprises in difficulty (e.g., railways) increases their vulnerability to shocks.
Another  important  challenge  that  emerging  and  transition  economies  face  is  that,
typically,  the salaries  of staff in Ministries of Finance  are significantly lower than those
in the central banks or the private sector and, consequently, there are chronic  difficulties
to recruit  staff with  the  appropriate  skills.  In  some  economies,  the  salary differential
between officials in the Ministry of Finance and the central bank can be ten-fold and very
often, Ministry officials have second jobs.  Where  governments  have been successful  in
attracting  highly  skilled  staff,  they  have  come  for the  experience  and after  gaining  the
know-how  of debt  management  they quickly move  on to the  private  sector where they
can  get higher pay.  Therefore,  staff retention  is also  a serious issue.  This is critical  in
countries where finance skills required for debt management are scarce overall.
Some  governments  in  emerging  market  economies  have  been  able to make  progress  in
confronting  these  problems  and  have  devised  ways  to  attract  skilled  workers,  with
reforms  in the  salary  scale  away  from  the  civil  service  structure,  and to  create  other
incentives  such  as  training  programs  and  improving  promotion  prospects  inside  the
46 Ministry  of Finance.  In  many  countries,  such  a  reform  may  be  very  difficult  to
implement  without a broader public sector reform program and the temptation to create a
SDMO in order to resolve this problem is very high.
Where does  this  leave governments  in emerging and  transition economies  endeavouring
to  upgrade  the  debt  management  capacity  and  building  institution  with  adequate
governance  structures?  The  following  are  implications  that  may  be  drawn  for  these
governments:
45  While  the  refinancing  risk  is minor  for these  countries,  it is a vital  public policy  issue  for transition
countnes.
46  See Jensen and Wheeler (forthcoming).
44o  Given  the  greater  vulnerability  of these  economies  to  financial  shocks  and  to
crises  in public debt management,  their debt management  should  focus primarily
on  the  public  policy  dimensions,  particularly  the  development  of the  domestic
debt market, and coordination with fiscal and monetary policy.
o  In order to  ensure  a strategic  debt management  which  addresses  the risks of the
aggregate  debt portfolio,  it is necessary  to  consolidated  functions  in one  single
DMO, and to give it clear objectives and have it develop strategic benchmarks.
o  One  of the  important  steps  that  can  be  taken  is  to  remove  debt  management
responsibilities from the central bank so that conflict of interest between monetary
and debt management  objectives  can be avoided.  This includes  the suspension of
debt issuance in the name of the central bank.
o  When the DMO does not have an independent instrument to implement its policy
(debt management is engrained with broader public policy), then delegation of the
operational  dimensions  of  debt  management  functions  to  a  SDMO  may  be
difficult because the DMO cannot be held accountable  for its own actions.
o  There is no apparent  need to place the DMO  outside of the Ministry of Finance,
except  to  pay  more  competitive  salaries.  Instead,  the  greater  need  for  closer
coordination  and  information  sharing  with  other  government  bodies  and
departments suggest that governments can learn from the experiences of advanced
OECD  countries  that  have  opted  for  a  DMO  located  within  the  Ministry  of
Finance/Treasury.
o  Countries  can  have  different  degrees  of  separation  of  the  SDMO,  and  also
different  arrangements  of  the  DMOs  located  inside  the  Ministry  of Finance.
Countries may wish to create DMOs in the form  of specialized  agencies, without
having to establish SDMOs.
o  To ward off political pressure to  lower  costs in the  short term  at the expense  of
greater risk, DMOs have emphasized  on the creation of clear long-term objectives
and  cost-risk  guidelines  and  benchmarks,  combined  with  periodic  reporting  to
Parliament,  and enhancing transparency in the debt management process.
o  Consideration  should be given to creative  ways to enhance  incentive  compatible
pay  structures  in line with the  skill needs.  Salary levels  should take  into account
the importance  of the job in terms of managing the largest liability portfolio in the
country  which  can  have  significant  impact  on  the  overall  economy  if poorly
managed.
o  Rather than developing  capacity both inside the SDMO and within the Ministry of
Finance  for  monitoring  purposes,  where  skilled  workforce  is  scarce  and public
funds  limited,  it would be more  efficient to concentrate  capacity building efforts
inside the Ministry of Finance.
45Drawing lessons  from the experiences of advanced OECD countries who have opted for
locating  their  DMOs  inside  the  Ministry  of  Finance  may  result  in  more  prudent
arrangements  for  many  emerging  and  transitions  economies.  Eventually,  when  the
economies  have  become  less  vulnerable  to  external  shocks, when  contingent  liabilities
are more under control, when domestic  debt market development is well underway,  these
countries  may  wish  to  revisit  the  issue  of  location  and  decide  whether  the  models
followed by such countries  as Sweden, Portugal and the U.K, or the models followed by
New  Zealand,  Australia  and  France are  more suitable  for their  economies.  Meanwhile,
however, these countries should seriously consider an overhaul of their debt management
policies  and practices,  in order to put in place what  can be considered  "modern"  public
debt management-this  will greatly reduce  their exposures  to various shocks.  Not doing
so is taking a large risk.
CONCLUMONS
Public  debt  management  implies  complex  interactions  between  public  policy  and
financial  transactions  within  a  strategic  risk-management  framework-and  this  has
important implications  for the choice of institutional arrangements.
In emerging  market  countries,  including  transition  countries,  the  economy  is typically
more  exposed  to  financial  shocks  and  is  more  vulnerable  to  crisis  in  public  debt
management,  which  implies  that the  public  policy  aspects  of risk  reduction  should  be
emphasized.  Institutional  arrangements  should  promote these public  policy elements  of
debt management,  in terms  of facilitating  coordination  with monetary and  fiscal policy,
the development of the  domestic  debt market,  the control of the possible  impact of risky
debt structures on the Budget, and the monitoring and possible management of contingent
liabilities.  Strictly financial  efficiency  considerations  (cost  savings)  are  also  important,
but they should be placed within the context of broader government priorities.
All  these  functions  can,  in  principle,  be  carried  out by a  consolidated  and technically
proficient  DMO located  within the  Ministry of Finance,  so  there would be no apparent
reason to place the DMO outside of the Ministry.
However,  civil  service  salary restrictions  has  frequently  led  to  inability  to  attract  and
recruit  staff with the  necessary  mix  of financial  and  public policy  know-how.  This  is
especially  true  in  emerging  market  and  transition  countries  where  the  pool  of highly
specialized  labor is small,  and where the private sector  gives-much higher compensation
for financial skills.
46Moreover,  sometimes  policy-makers  in these countries  do not realize  the  importance  of
reforming and upgrading public debt management  - partly  because the area of expertise
itself  is  quite  new.  There  is  nothing  inherently  forcing  institutional  change,  and
sometimes  a  major  debt crisis  is needed  to  bring attention  to  the need  for institutional
capacity-building,  often required in order to complement macroeconomic reforms.
This is not the case  when a separate DMO (SDMO)  is established,  as its creation forces
the definition of objectives,  a governance  structure, accountability  and reporting,  staffing
issues,  IT infrastructure,  etc.  More  likely than  not,  it will  involve a major  overhaul  of
public debt management.
However,  a SDMO is not a panacea,  inasmuch  as it puts  it at a distance from  the rest of
the  public  sector  and  aggravates  the  principal-agent  problem.  Risks  arise  that  it  can
become more of an island and have less of a public policy "culture".  Accountability may
be  difficult  to  enforce  in  environments  where  there  are  many  linkages  and
interdependencies  between debt management  and monetary policy, for example.
Risks  may be  aggravated  if the  SDMO  is given  incentives  to  trade actively  vis-a-vis  a
benchmark,  particularly so if salary incentives  are attached.  It is vital that active trading
seeking  to  "beat  the  benchmark"  operate  in  an  institutional  framework  with  clear
objectives, strict controls, and sound reporting, accountability  and transparency,  and other
governance  elements. The  experience  of advanced  OECD countries  shows it takes years
to develop such a framework and requires  important investments  in checks and balances.
Thus,  countries  may  have  to  weigh  the  relative  costs  and  benefits  of the  different
institutional arrangements,  and eventually arrive at some kind of trade-off. Ideally, public
debt could be managed  within the Ministry of Finance in a consolidated  unit, with clear
governance  arrangements  and  a  highly  technical  and  dedicated  staff  showing  little
rotation.  If this  is not possible,  countries  may have to consider "agency"  figures  within
the Ministry,  or even a separate DMO, and then consider how to deal with the principal-
agent  issues  that  become  more  pressing  alongside  with  greater  separation  from  the
Ministry.
Although  gradual  progress  has taken place in the  last decade  in the  area of public debt
management  in  many  emerging  and  transition  countries,  there  is  still a  great need  for
institutional capacity building to improve  debt management in these countries. Resources
should be provided  to train specialized  staff,  promote  the development  of the domestic
debt market, develop  the capacities of the middle office, create risk quantification models
with links to the budget, and implement contingent liability monitoring and management.
Incentives  should  not  be  given  at  these  relatively  early  stages  to  obtain marginal  cost
savings.  The priority  is to  create  an  incentive  structure  which  leads  to  a  focus on  the
"government balance-sheet risk management"  aspect of debt management  and much less
so on marginal cost efficiencies.
In  sum,  the  experience  of  advanced  OECD  countries  suggests  that  transition  and
emerging market  economies may have to carry out a very careful  analysis of the type of
47institutional  arrangements  best suited  for their public debt management.  This is because
they  tend  to  have  an  economic  situation  where  public  policy  elements  are  vital  (e.g.
development  of domestic  debt  markets,  coordination  with  monetary  policy,  impact  of
debt  servicing  on the  budget,  control  of contingent  liabilities)  and because  the  lack  of
independent  policy  instruments  severely  hampers  their  ability  to  align  responsibilities
with  accountabilities  so  that  simultaneously  the  government  may  have  difficulties  in
establishing  the  control  mechanisms  needed  for a  separate  debt management  office.  If
they  decide  to  maintain  debt  management  functions  within  the  Ministry,  the  OECD
experience  shows  the  necessity  of  updating  and  modernizing  debt  management,
consolidating  debt  management  functions  in  one  location,  establishing  a  strategic
approach,  strengthening the institutional capacity to deal with both the financial  portfolio
management  aspects  and  the  public  policy  aspects  of  debt  management,  creating
mechanisms  for assuring  successful delegation  and accountability,  and  last but not least,
solving the issues of adequate  salaries and staffing.
48ANNEX
Annex Table A. 1. below summarizes the governance  structures of the DMOs,  and Annex
Box B. 1.  discusses  corporate  governance  arrangements  for  public debt management  by
describing how boards and committees function in selected countries.
Annex Table A.1.  Debt Management  and ALM  Committees in Selected  Countries
COUNTRY  Board  of  Advisory  Committee(s)
Directors  Board
Sweden (indep.agency)  Yes  X  i
Portugal (indep.agency)  Yes  Yes
Ireland (indep.agency)  Yes
New Zealand (agency  in MoF)  Yes
Belgium (agency m MoF)  Yes
South Africa (Dept in MoF)  Yes
Colombia  (Dept ui MoF)  I  t Yes
Note:  Committees  and Boards reporting to the Minister of Finance
Annex  Box B.1.  Corporate Governance  for Public Debt Management: Examples  of
Boards and Committees
In Australia an  Advisory  Board was  established  in December  2000.  The  accountability  of the
Board is to the Secretary to the Treasury,  the Chair of the Board.  Its role is to provide  advice to
the Secretary to the Treasury.  Although the Board does not possess executive powers or decision
making authority  in its own right,  the Board advises the Secretary on matters relating to corporate
governance,  strategic  planning,  financial  risk management strategy,  business  and planning.  The
Board  also  provides  advice  to the  Secretary  with respect  to  monitoring the performance  of the
AOFM generally.  The Board  meets  on a monthly basis.  The  six  member  Board comprises the
Secretary to the Treasury,  the Executive  Director of the Economics  Group in the  Department  of
the  Treasury,  a  Senior  Executive  from  the  Department  of  Finance  and  Administration
(representing  the  Secretary of the  Department),  the  CEO of the AOFM  and two representatives
from the private sector.  Three committees have been established  for AOFM internal  governance.
A  Liability  Management  Committee  has  primary  responsibility  for  establishing  policy  and
programs  goveming  debt management  operations  and reviewing liability performance;  an Audit
Committee  has  responsibility  for  statutory  financial  reporting  and  for  monitoring  internal
financial controls;  and a Management Committee  has responsibility  for oversight and reviewing
the overall strategic  management of the organisation.
Source: AOFM Annual Report 2001. http://www.aofm.gov.au/
49Sweden's  DM0 Board  of Commissioners  is made up of eight members,  all  appointed  by the
Government,  including  the  Director  General  of  the  DM0  as  chairman,  four  members  of
Parliament,  and the remaining members including academics and heads of think tanks. The Board
normally  meets  six  times  a  year  and  decides  on  the  proposal  to  the  Government  for  debt
management guidelines, the principles guiding the implementation of the Government guidelines,
the data  to be presented to the Government for its evaluation of the Debt Office's activities, and
the limits and guidelines for the management of the risks associated with the DMO's activities. In
addition, the Board takes decisions  with respect to the DMO's annual reports to the Government,
budget data,  audit reports and internal audit plans  (source: http://www.rak.se/aboutthesndo.htm  )
Portugal's DM0 Board of Directors meets once a week and includes the head of the DM0 and
two  other  members,  all  appointed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  for  a  3-year  mandate.  Its
responsibilities include all organizational  and operational matters of the DM0 such as defining its
internal  management  policy,  as well as the  structure and functions of the departments, preparing
the annual budget for the Minister, managing the human  resources  and assets of the DM0, etc.
The Advisory Board, on the other hand, is made up of the head of the DM0, one member of the
central bank's Board of Directors, and four persons having recognized expertise  in economic  and
financial  matters,  also appointed  by the Council  of Ministers. The AB meets at least once every
quarter,  and must  express  its opinion  on  the  annual  financing  plan of the  State, on the annual
report on financing and the public debt and any other matters solicited. (http://www.igcp.pt/l
New  Zealand's  DM0  has  a  three  member  Advisory  Board,  comprising  private  sector
representatives,  which  assists  the  Secretary  to  the  State  in  providing  quality  assurance  on the
management  of the NZDMO.  It meets a  minimum of four times  a year,  and provides oversight
and  advice  across  a  broad  range  of  operational  and  strategic  risk  management  issues  and
procedural controls. (http://www.nzdmo.govt.nz/aboutnzdmo/)
Ireland's DM0 has an Advisory Board, composed mostly of private sector  executives  from the
banking and corporate sector, and the Secretary of the MoF. (source: http://www.ntma.ie/)
France's  DMO's  Strategic  Committee  is  made  up  of  leading  experts  from  different
backgrounds  providing  Agency France  Tresor with  advice  on govemment  issuing policy.  The
purpose  of  the  SC  is  pnmarily  to  offer  its  own  interpretation  of the  principles  underlying
govemment  issuing policy and  treasury management  and to state its views on existing practices
and contemplated  developments.  The SC meets twice a year.  The Market Committee is chaired
by the Treasury Director, and is made up of top bond managers  from the most active French and
foreign pnmary dealers.  This committee discusses developments on bond markets  in Europe and
the rest of the world from the viewpoint of investors,  issuers and intermediaries, to make sure that
Agency France  Tresor's issumg policy  and the  organization  of the French government  securities
market  continue to reflect strict application of public finance  management  rules and to meet the
expectations  of all  market  players.  The  Market  Committee  meets  two  or  three  times  a  year.
(Source: www.francetresor.gouv.fr)
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Chief Executive  and  the  heads  of two business  areas  and  main
functional  teams constitute the  Managing Committee which is the senior decision making body
for the DM0.  All strategic  operational  and management issues  must be considered by the MC.
The MC  is guided  by an  Advisory  Board  which  comprises  the Chief Executive,  the Deputy
Chief Executive  (and  head of policy  and  markets)  and the  head of operations  and resources,
together with non-executive members  from outside  the DM0.  The MC is supported by a Credit
and  Risk  Committee  and  Strategy  Groups  for  each  key  business  area  (debt,  cash  and
investments). http://www.dmo.gov.uk/
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